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THE TWILIGHT OF THE PARDON POWER 
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE* 
For most of our nation’s history, the president’s constitutional pardon 
power has been used with generosity and regularity to correct systemic 
injustices and to advance the executive’s policy goals.  Since 1980, 
however, presidential pardoning has fallen on hard times, its benign 
purposes frustrated by politicians’ fear of making a mistake, and subverted 
by unfairness in the way pardons are granted.  The diminished role of 
clemency is unfortunate, since federal law makes almost no provision for 
shortening a prison term and none at all for mitigating the collateral 
consequences of conviction.  It would be bad enough in these circumstances 
if presidents had made a conscious choice not to pardon at all, or to make 
only occasional symbolic use of their constitutional power.  But what makes 
the situation intolerable is that, as the official route to clemency has all but 
closed, the back-door route has opened wide.  In the past two 
administrations, petitioners with personal or political connections in the 
White House bypassed the pardon bureaucracy in the Department of 
Justice, disregarded its regulations, and obtained clemency by means (and 
sometimes on grounds) not available to the less privileged.  Much 
responsibility for the disuse and disrepute into which a once-proud and 
useful institution of government has fallen must be laid at the door of the 
Justice Department, which has failed in its responsibilities as steward of the 
pardon power, exposing the president to embarrassment and the power to 
abuse.  To date, President Obama has taken no steps to reform and 
reinvigorate a pardon process that has, in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
words, been “drained of its moral force.” 
Why has the president’s pardon power essentially ceased to function?  
Is it attributable to political caution, or is there something else at work?  To 
find the answer, this Article first looks at pardoning practices in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a time when the pardon power 
played an important operational role in the federal justice system.  It 
 
* Law Office of Margaret Love, former U.S. Pardon Attorney (1990-1997).  I am grateful 
to Albert Alschuler and Samuel Morison for their helpful comments on earlier versions of 
this article. 
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describes how pardon evolved into parole, and how after 1930 pardon 
came to be used primarily to restore rights of citizenship.  It then examines 
the reasons for pardon’s decline in the 1980s and its collapse in the Clinton 
Administration.  Finally, it argues that President Obama should want to 
revive the power, and suggests how he might do it. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost two years after taking office, President Barack Obama had yet 
to issue his first pardon.1  Almost 5,000 petitions for clemency awaited his 
consideration.2  At the same point in his presidency, Abraham Lincoln had 
granted clemency to over 200 ordinary citizens and many hundreds of 
soldiers.3  In their first year in office, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt issued 
134 clemency grants, Franklin Roosevelt 204, and Truman 107.4 
President Obama’s early reticence in matters of official forgiveness 
should not be surprising, for it continues a trend begun in the Reagan 
 
1 At the time this article went to press shortly after Thanksgiving 2010, President Obama 
had not acted favorably on any applications for clemency, and had denied 676.  Almost 
5,000 petitions for pardon and commutation were pending in the Office of the Pardon 
Attorney.  See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENTIAL 
CLEMENCY ACTIONS BY ADMINISTRATION: 1945 TO PRESENT (2010), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/actions_administration.htm [hereinafter OPA CLEMENCY 
STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT].  President Obama, like Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. 
Bush before him, confined his first-year pardoning to the Thanksgiving turkey presented to 
him by the National Turkey Federation and the Poultry and Egg National Board.  See 
Katherine Skiba, Turkey Gets to Duck Dinner Date: Obama Pardons “Courage” in Holiday 
Ritual, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 2009, at C3; see also Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon People, 
Too, Mr. President, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2010, at A17.  
2 OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1. The processing time for 
pardon petitions has lengthened from months to years, and case backlogs have become 
permanent.  Many of the grants issued by President George W. Bush went to individuals 
who had filed their petitions more than a decade earlier.  See Margaret Colgate Love, Final 
Report Card on Pardoning by George W. Bush 1-2 (Mar. 13, 2009) (unpublished paper, 
available at http://www.pardonlaw.com/materials/FinalReportCard.3.13.09.pdf). 
3 See P.S. Ruckman, Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making, 
29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84 (1999). 
4 OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY 
ACTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, 1900-1945, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/actions_fiscal.htm (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2010) [hereinafter OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1900-1945]; OPA 
CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1.  The annual reports of the attorney 
general from 1885 through 1931 include detailed charts of each clemency grant and, 
frequently, the reason or reasons that clemency was recommended.  Clemency statistics 
dating from the first Cleveland Administration (1885-1889) show a consistent pattern of 
early first-term pardoning until the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, neither 
of whom made use of their pardon power until their third year in office.  See also P.S. 
RUCKMAN, JR., “LAST MINUTE” PARDON SCANDALS: FACT AND FICTION 15-27 (2004), 
http://pardonresearch.com/papers.htm. 
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Administration that accelerated under Bill Clinton.  What was once a steady 
stream of presidential clemency grants has dwindled to a token few.  The 
process for administering the president’s power in the Department of 
Justice now functions primarily to protect the handiwork of federal 
prosecutors.  Like his immediate predecessors and most (though by no 
means all5) current governors, President Obama appears to have concluded 
that there is too little gain and too much risk in pardoning to make it a 
worthwhile activity.6 
The diminished role of clemency reflects and reinforces a justice 
system that has become inhumane and politicized.  We live in a nation that 
imprisons a higher proportion of its population than any other in the world 
and that permanently stigmatizes those convicted of crime.7  But federal 
law makes almost no provision for shortening a prison term and makes no 
provision at all for mitigating the collateral consequences of conviction.8 
It would be bad enough if presidents had made a conscious choice not 
to pardon at all or to make only occasional symbolic use of their 
constitutional power.  But what makes current federal pardoning practice 
intolerable is that as the official route to clemency has all but closed, the 
back-door route has opened wide.  In the two administrations that preceded 
 
5 A few governors have used their pardon power in recent years, some based on a 
longstanding tradition of granting clemency in their state, some to ease overcrowding in their 
state’s prison system, and some out of personal conviction.  See e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The 
Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED SENT’G REP. 153, 153-55 
(2009) (discussing policies of Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, Maryland Governor 
Robert Ehrlich, and Virginia Governor Tim Kaine); Gov. Jennifer Granholm OKs Clemency 
for 100 Inmates in 2 Years, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 17, 2010), http://www.mlive.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2010/01/gov_jennifer_granholm_oks_clem.html (describing over 100 
commutations granted by Michigan Governor Granholm to ease prison budget crisis).  State 
clemency policies and practices are beyond the scope of this article, and are described in 
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE (2006), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/Collateral%20Consequences/execsumm.pdf 
[hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
6 It has been said that President Obama has been “too busy” in his first two years in 
office to consider pardon applications.  Presidents Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt had plates 
at least as full at the beginning of their tenures, however, and still managed to take care of 
this bit of presidential housekeeping business.  A review of presidential pardoning practices 
over the years suggests that something more than the press of other business has depressed 
the past three presidents’ use of this most benign and personal of their constitutional powers. 
7 See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006); Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, 
and the Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857 (2009). 
8 Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1722-23 (2003). 
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Obama’s, petitioners with personal or political connections to the 
presidency bypassed the pardon bureaucracy in the Department of Justice, 
disregarded its regulations, and obtained clemency by means (and 
sometimes on grounds) not available to the less privileged.  The 
Department of Justice invited these end runs by refusing to take seriously 
its responsibilities as presidential advisor in clemency matters, by exposing 
President Clinton to charges of cronyism, and then President Bush to 
charges of incompetence.  The two presidents are also at fault: in 
confirming popular beliefs about pardon’s irregularity and unfairness, they 
disserved both the institution of the presidency and their own legacies.  To 
date, President Obama has taken no steps to reform and reinvigorate a 
pardon process that has, in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s words, been 
“drained of its moral force.”9 
Who hijacked the president’s pardon power?  Is it worth rescuing, or 
should it be left to wither away in peace?  To find the answers, Part II of 
this Article looks at pardoning practices in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, a time when pardon played an important operational 
role in the federal justice system.  It describes how pardon evolved into 
parole, and how in an age of indeterminate sentencing pardon came to be 
used primarily to restore rights of citizenship.  Part III examines the reasons 
for pardon’s decline in the 1980s and its collapse in the Clinton 
Administration.  Part IV argues that President Obama should want to revive 
the power and suggests how he might do it. 
II. PUBLIC MERCY FROM 1789 TO 1980 
In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton justified giving the 
president exclusive control of the “benign prerogative of pardoning” in 
terms of two great public purposes: to temper the law’s harsh results as a 
matter of compassion and to intercede to defuse a politically inflammatory 
situation.10  As to the first of these purposes, Hamilton observed that 
“without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice 
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”11  With respect to the 
 
9 Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American 
Bar Association (Aug. 9, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 128 (2003).  Pointing 
out that pardons have “become infrequent,” Justice Kennedy opined that “[a] people 
confident in its laws and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy.”  Id.; see also Dretke 
v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Among its benign if too-often 
ignored objects, the clemency power can correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process 
seems unable or unwilling to consider.”). 
10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
11 Id.; see also Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in DOUGLAS 
HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN 18TH CENTURY ENGLAND 44 
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second, he proposed that “in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are 
often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents 
or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”12  In a 
government otherwise of limited powers, there was to be no check on the 
president’s prerogative but public opinion.13 
Examples of pardon used as a tool of statecraft abound in American 
history, often linked to wartime exigency or post-war amnesties.  George 
Washington granted his first pardons in 1794 to Pennsylvania farmers 
challenging the federal government’s power to tax whiskey.14  Sixty years 
later, Abraham Lincoln used the pardon power to bring a measured end to 
another dangerous internal rebellion, this time involving the “largest 
massacre of whites by Indians in American history.”15  Presidents since 
Thomas Jefferson have issued post-war pardons to deserters and draft 
evaders16 and issued pardons to signal their disagreement with a law.17  
 
(1975) (“[The pardon] moderated the barbarity of the criminal law in the interests of 
humanity.  It was erratic and capricious, but a useful palliative until Parliament reformed the 
law in the nineteenth century.”). 
12 THE FEDERALIST, NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
13 While the prospect of punishment at the polls or impeachment may have no persuasive 
value for a president at the end of his term, the Framers believed that the president would 
always be restrained by the risk of what James Iredell called “the damnation of his fame to 
all future ages.”  JAMES IREDELL, ADDRESS IN THE NORTH CAROLINA RATIFYING CONVENTION 
(1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, at 380-82 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 
1993).  The political checks on the pardon power have collectively been called “limited and 
clumsy.”  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-10, at 721 (3d ed. 
2000).  Even sixty years ago when pardoning was frequent and routine, the only systematic 
study of the federal pardon power noted the “persistence of erroneous ideas, the lack of exact 
information, and the absence of publicity concerning the acts of the pardoning authority 
envelop the power in a veil of mystery.”  W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE 
PRESIDENT 6 (1941). 
14 See JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 55-56 (2009).  After the so-
called Whiskey Rebellion had ended peacefully with the ringleaders pardoned individually 
and the other insurgents granted amnesty, Washington explained to Congress that his 
pardons had been motivated both by mercy and the public interest: “[I]t appears to me no 
less consistent with the public good than it is with my personal feelings to mingle in the 
operations of Government every degree of moderation and tenderness which the national 
justice, dignity, and safety may permit.”  President George Washington, Seventh Annual 
Address (Dec. 8, 1795), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 184 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1896). 
15 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 392 (1995).  Lincoln sent troops to quell the Sioux 
uprising in Minnesota, and later personally reviewed a list of 303 men condemned to death 
by military tribunal, commuting all but thirty-eight of them, provoking public outrage. See 
Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 87-88. 
16 Madison issued amnesties on three separate occasions during the War of 1812 to 
persuade deserters from the army to return to service. See AMNESTY IN AMERICA 24 (Morris 
Sherman ed., 1974). Lincoln approved amnesties for Confederate rebels during the Civil 
War in an effort to co-opt them to the Union side, while Andrew Johnson issued amnesties 
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Pardon has also figured in such politically divisive issues as labor 
organizing, race relations, polygamy, and Puerto Rican independence.18  
 
after the conclusion of hostilities to promote national healing.  See CROUCH, supra note 14, 
at 40-43. Theodore Roosevelt pardoned participants in the Philippine insurrection, see 
Proclamation 483 (July 4, 1902), and Warren Harding pardoned Eugene V. Debs and others 
convicted of subverting military recruitment during World War I.  CROUCH, supra note 14, at 
56-57.  Harry Truman issued proclamations pardoning ex-convicts who had served in the 
armed forces during World War II and the Korean War, see Proclamation 2676, 10 Fed. Reg. 
15,409 (Dec, 24, 1945) and Proclamation 3000, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,833 (Dec. 24, 1952), and 
1,523 individuals convicted of Selective Service Act violations who had been recommended 
for pardon by a presidentially appointed three-person “Amnesty Board.”  See Proclamation 
2762, 12 Fed. Reg. 8,731 (Dec. 24, 1947); Executive Order 9814 (Dec. 23, 1946).  
Presidents Ford and Carter pardoned persons guilty of military and selective service 
violations following the Vietnam War.  See generally U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1975); Proclamation 4483, 3 C.F.R. § 4 (1978).  As one pardon 
scholar has observed, “pardons are a better signal than an armistice agreement to show that a 
war is truly over and that peace is restored.”  KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, 
MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 51 (1989). 
17 For example, Jefferson pardoned some of those convicted under the Alien and Sedition 
Acts because he considered these acts unconstitutional.  See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., THE 
PARDONING POWER: THE OTHER “CIVICS LESSON” 9 (2001), http://pardonresearch.com/ 
papers/7.pdf.  Woodrow Wilson, whose veto had failed to prevent passage of the Volstead 
Act, pardoned dozens of liquor law violators.  Id. at 7-8.  A similar dislike of a law was 
behind Clinton’s last-day pardon of people prosecuted under the Independent Counsel Act.  
See Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clinton’s Last-Day Clemency Benefits 176; List 
Includes Pardons for Cisneros, McDougal, Deutch and Roger Clinton, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 
2001, at A1 (“Clinton appeared to be tying up loose ends from many of the independent 
counsel investigations that had daunted him and several senior members of his 
administration virtually from the beginning of his tenure.”).  In the 1960s, John Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson together commuted the prison sentences of more than 300 drug offenders, 
laying the groundwork for repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing laws in the 1970s.  See 
1963 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 62-63 (1963); 1964 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 64 (1964); see also 
Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 5, 
6 (2007) (“In a more recent ‘systematic’ use of the power evidently intended to send a 
message to Congress, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson commuted the sentences of more 
than 200 drug offenders serving mandatory minimum sentences under the Narcotics Control 
Act of 1956.”); Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Pardons, 13 FED. 
SENT’G RPT. 139, 141-43 (2001) (describing how clemency can be used systematically to 
create and spur policy changes). 
18 See CROUCH, supra note 14, at 56-60 (discussing clemency grants to Eugene Debs, 
Jimmy Hoffa, Oscar Collazo, Marcus Garvey, and FALN Puerto Rican nationalists).    James 
Buchanan pardoned Mormon participants in the Utah War of 1857-1858, see Donna G. 
Ramos, Utah War: U.S. Government Versus Mormon Settlers, http://www.historynet.com/ 
utah-war-us-government-versus-mormon-settlers.htm (last visited August 27, 2010), and 
Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland later pardoned Mormon polygamists to smooth the 
path to Utah’s statehood.  Bonnie K. Goodman, January 4 1986: Utah is Admitted as the 
45th State of the Union, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, Jan. 1, 2008, http://hnn.us/ 
blogs/entries/46038.html. 
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Arguably the most famous statecraft pardon is Gerald Ford’s of Richard 
Nixon. 
While the tradition of clemency as statecraft is an important and 
enduring one in this country, this Article is concerned with the equally 
important tradition of clemency as a tool of justice to make “exceptions in 
favor of unfortunate guilt.”19 
A. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PARDON POWER BEFORE 1870 
From the earliest years of the Republic, pardon was used to benefit 
ordinary people for whom the results of a criminal prosecution were 
considered unduly harsh or unfair.  This kind of low-level pardoning took 
place largely out of the public eye, but with some regularity.  Presidents 
spent what seems today like a great deal of their time in office considering 
pardon requests, which frequently came from judges forced to apply laws 
they regarded as excessively harsh.20  Presidents granted clemency to a high 
percentage of those who asked for it, forestalling or halting prosecutions, 
cutting short prison sentences or remitting them entirely, forgiving fines and 
forfeitures, and occasionally restoring citizenship rights lost as a result of 
conviction.   
The secretary of state was the official custodian of pardon documents, 
but the presidents generally relied on their attorneys general for advice 
about how and when to exercise their constitutional power.  Access to the 
president’s mercy sometimes depended upon personal or political 
 
19 See Kennedy, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
20 See generally George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences 
and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 212 (2004). 
The pardon archives disclose that, in the early federal justice system, the President played an 
important and active role in making what Alexander Hamilton called “exceptions in favor of 
unfortunate guilt,” often at the behest of a federal judge frustrated by the severity of the penalty 
he had been required by law to impose.  Judges urged the President to intervene not only in 
capital cases, but also in cases involving mandatory fines (which had to be paid before a person 
could be released) and prison terms. 
Often defendants would petition the sentencing court directly for clemency, giving the judge an 
opportunity to send the petition on to the President with a recommendation.  Occasionally judges 
took the initiative in approaching the President rather than rely on the cumbersome machinery of 
law.  Such early judicial activism was particularly evident in District of Columbia cases prior to 
1831, and in cases involving employee mail theft. 
Id.  Recently some judges, compelled by mandatory sentencing laws to impose sentences 
they regard as too harsh, have resumed the practice of recommending clemency at the time 
of sentencing.  See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(expressing support for trial judge’s recommendation that life sentence for drug trafficking 
be commuted after fifteen years).  See generally Joanna M. Huang, Correcting Mandatory 
Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 60 DUKE. L. J. 131 (2010).  
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connections, and early pardon warrants reveal that the president frequently 
gave weight to “respectable testimonials” about a pardon petitioner’s 
former good character from prominent citizens.21  Thomas Jefferson began 
the practice of routinely seeking the views of district attorneys and judges, 
declaring that “[n]o pardon is granted in any case but on the 
recommendation of the judges who sat on the trial & who best know & 
estimate the degree of the crime, & character and deportment of the 
criminal.”22  Later presidents would continue this practice.23  Reasons for 
pardon were occasionally spelled out in pardon warrants, though James 
Polk was the first president to adopt this practice on a systematic basis.24 
The informal and idiosyncratic system for administering the pardon 
power that prevailed in the first half of the nineteenth century began to 
crystallize in 1852 when Daniel Webster, Millard Fillmore’s Secretary of 
State, formally handed over responsibility for investigating and making 
recommendations on clemency petitions to Attorney General William 
 
21 See, e.g., Lardner & Love, supra note 20, at 219. 
22 See id. at 220, n.21 (citing Jefferson’s statement in National Archives and Records 
Administration, Petitions for Pardon - 1789-1860, Record Group 59//893, box 2, file 104). 
23 See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 86-88.  The requirement to seek the advice of the 
relevant United States Attorney in every case was spelled out in Justice Department 
clemency regulations between 1898 and 1946 (clemency regulations dating from 1898 
available from the Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice).  After 1962, 
the requirement was no longer in the clemency regulations, though the pardon attorney 
invariably seeks the recommendation of the U.S. Attorney and judge when favorable 
consideration is being considered.  See Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the 
Moral Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 39 (2005) (“[I]f the 
background investigation suggests that a pardon may warranted [sic], or in cases which are 
of particular importance or in which significant factual questions persist, the Pardon 
Attorney requests input from the prosecuting authority and the sentencing judge concerning 
the merits of the petition.”). 
24 Journalist George Lardner, Jr., is preparing a comprehensive history of presidential 
clemency based on extensive research in State Department and Presidential archives, and he 
has generously shared with me several draft chapters of his untitled manuscript.  Most of the 
information about pardoning prior to 1858 comes from the chapter tentatively titled “A 
Golden Age for the Pardon Power.”  Lardner reports that Polk “was his own pardon 
attorney,” who 
wrote careful notes, demanding copies of indictments and court records, insisting on reports from 
judges and district attorneys . . . .  His pardons often provided harsh glimpses of the justice 
system, setting out a judges admissions about the unreliability of a key prosecution witness in 
one case, a jury’s belated discovery of false testimony in another, and in yet another the 
incompetence of a steamboat inspection that left a crippled captain facing civil prosecution 
because his boiler exploded. 
Id. at 341 (citations omitted). 
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Crittenden.25  Under President Buchanan, a pardon clerk was appointed to 
assist the attorney general in his new administrative responsibilities.26 
During the Civil War, President Lincoln’s inclination to be merciful 
and his sensitivity to the pardon’s political usefulness were the source of 
some frustration to his generals—though his pardoning apparently inspired 
the troops.27  He once spared the lives of sixty-two deserters in a single 
order28 and wrote to General George Meade that he was “unwilling for any 
boy under eighteen to be shot.”29  General William T. Sherman complained 
to the Judge Advocate General that Lincoln found it “very hard . . . to hang 
spies,” reporting that he intended “to execute a good many spies and 
guerrillas—without . . . bothering the President.”30  President Lincoln spent 
long hours reviewing clemency requests from soldiers and their families,31 
and famously entertained pardon petitioners at the White House. 
 
25 See HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 149 (1937).  The State 
Department had previously processed clemency applications, but in 1858, Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster and Attorney General John Crittenden agreed that “petitions should pass 
entirely into the Attorney General’s charge, although warrants should still issue from the 
State Department.”  Id.  President Cleveland transferred authority to issue pardon warrants to 
the Justice Department by executive order in 1893.  See Lardner & Love, supra note 20, at 
220 n.21 (citing Exec. Order of June 16, 1893 (on file at the Office of the Pardon Attorney)).  
26 See Lardner, supra note 24, at 351 (citing NARS RG 204/10/A/344); see also Act of 
March 8, 1865, ch. 98, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 516 (authorizing employment of a pardon clerk 
at a salary of $1,800 per year). 
27 A popular poem of 1863 recited a fanciful tale of Lincoln’s pardon of William Scott, a 
soldier sentenced to death for sleeping on sentry duty.  FRANCIS DE HAES JAVIER, THE 
SLEEPING SENTINEL: AN INCIDENT IN VERSE 16 (1863) (“He came to save that stricken soul, 
now waking from despair; and from a thousand voices rose a shout which rent the air!  The 
pardoned soldier understood the tones of jubilee, and, bounding from his fetters, blessed the 
hand that made him free!”).  In 1870, Harper’s Weekly published a full-page illustration of 
Lincoln arriving at the place of Scott’s scheduled execution barely in time to save his life, 
and in 1914, Scott’s pardon became the plot of a silent motion picture.  THE SLEEPING 
SENTINEL (Lubin Manufacturing Company 1914); see also William Scott (The Sleeping 
Sentinel), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Scott_(The_Sleeping_Sentinel) 
(last visited March 7, 2010 ). 
28 See Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 85 (citing BELL IRVIN WILEY, THE LIFE OF 
BILLY YANK: THE COMMON SOLDIER OF THE UNION 216 (1972)).  A total of 267 men were 
executed by the military authorities during the Civil War, and 141 of them were deserters.  J. 
T. Dorris, President Lincoln’s Clemency, 20 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 547, 553 (1953). 
29 CARL SANDBURG, 3 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 476 (1939). 
30 Dorris, supra note 28, at 550 (citing 7 WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICIAL RECORDS OF 
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 18-19 (1897)).  When asked on another occasion how 
he was able to execute court-marshaled offenders without presidential interference, Sherman 
replied, “I shot them first.”  Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 85 (citing RICHARD N. 
CURRENT, THE LINCOLN NOBODY KNOWS 169 (1958)). 
31 See, e.g., INSIDE LINCOLN’S WHITE HOUSE: THE COMPLETE CIVIL WAR DIARY OF JOHN 
HAY 64 (Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner eds., 1997) (describing a six-hour session in 
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While Lincoln’s military pardons are the stuff of legend, he also issued 
331 clemency warrants to people convicted in the civilian courts.  Attorney 
General Edward Bates, the embodiment of an emerging institutional 
impulse to manage the practice of pardoning, worked hard to control access 
to the president and keep track of those to whom he made promises.  Pardon 
Clerk Edmund Stedman reported, “My chief, Attorney General Bates, soon 
discovered that my most important duty was to keep all but the most 
deserving cases from coming before the kind Mr. Lincoln at all; since there 
was nothing harder for him to do than put aside a prisoner’s 
application . . . .”32  Indeed, the Attorney General declared that President 
Lincoln was “unfit to be trusted with the pardoning power,” partly because 
he was too susceptible to women’s tears.33  Lincoln accepted advice from 
all quarters, and frequently provided explicit and detailed reasons for 
clemency decisions in the warrants themselves.34  At the same time, he 
approved many capital sentences, in one case rejecting a petition for 
clemency signed by ninety-one members of Congress.35 
B. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE PARDON POWER, 1870-1930 
A regime in which a petitioner could appear personally before the 
president to plead for a pardon became unthinkable after the Civil War as 
the federal justice system grew in size and complexity.  Attorney General 
Bates and General Sherman were also probably correct in complaining that 
a system based on personal access made it too difficult for a president to 
say no and too easy for individuals with a personal or political agenda to 
 
which Lincoln eagerly “caught at any fact which would justify him in saving the life of a 
condemned soldier”). 
32 Dorris, supra note 28, at 550 (citing LAURA STEDMAN & GEORGE M. GOULD, 1 LIFE 
AND LETTERS OF EDMUND CLARENCE STEDMAN 265 (1910)). 
33 RICHARD N. CURRENT, THE LINCOLN NOBODY KNOWS 169 (1958).  People joked that 
enterprising merchants in the District of Columbia rented weeping children and widow’s 
weeds to the mothers of condemned soldiers before their audiences with the President.  See 
WILLIAM E. BARTON, 2 THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (1925). 
34 Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 93-94.  Ruckman and Kincaid conclude that 
Lincoln used “the clemency decision-making process as a way to win the respect and support 
of the citizenry.”  Id. at 95.  Petitioners were evidently well-advised to stop on Capitol Hill 
and other governmental centers on their way to the White House, for Lincoln’s clemency 
warrants noted the support of U.S. Senators (15 warrants); members of Congress (14 
warrants); governors (12 warrants); judges, including one Supreme Court Justice (73 
warrants); prosecutors (78 warrants); and prison officials (44 warrants).  Id. at 93-94.  They 
also noted the support of former public officials, state legislators, mayors, aldermen, 
generals, the Vice President, and many ordinary citizens.  Id.  The clemency warrant of one 
offender, for example, recited the endorsement of a “large majority” of the Pennsylvania 
legislature and “several thousand citizens.”  Id. at 94. 
35 Dorris, supra note 28, at 554. 
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influence the exercise of the president’s power.  The solution to both 
problems was to place the administration of the pardon power firmly and 
exclusively in the hands of the attorney general.  This made sense not only 
to avoid compromising the president or wasting his time, but also to ensure 
that the pardon power would be able to function as an integral part of the 
justice system. 
The administrative system formalized after the Department of Justice 
was established in 1870 made the unruly power part of the more general 
transformation of the justice system to an administrative state, steering most 
clemency suitors away from the president’s door for over 100 years.  At this 
time, the attorney general also became responsible for the proper care of 
federal prisoners, then mostly housed in state facilities, and he made it a 
priority to ensure their access to the clemency process.  In 1880, he reported 
that: 
A system of regular inspection has been instituted whereby prisoners are visited as 
often as once in six months, with a view of ascertaining from personal observation 
their treatment and their wants.  These visits are made by a representative of this 
department, and he has personal interviews with the prisoners, individually and alone, 
in order to determine whether there were just grounds of complaint of the discipline to 
which they were subjected.  I have every reason to believe that he has carefully and 
humanely performed his duty in the matter.  He has also been instructed to bring, 
through this department, to the attention of the President, consideration of any case 
which seems to require executive clemency toward sick or friendless prisoners who 
might otherwise have no means of communicating with the pardoning power.  A 
system of forms has been prepared by this officer by which all jails and prisons are 
required to furnish monthly reports with full particulars as to prisoners of the United 
States in their charge.36 
In 1887, Clerk of Pardons Alexander Boteler reported to Congress on 
the general handling of pardon applications: “Every application for pardon 
addressed to the President is referred to the Attorney-General and by him to 
the clerk of pardons for his prompt and appropriate attention.”37  In turn, he 
reported, the “clerk of pardons” asked the United States Attorneys and 
judges for their views, continuing the practice begun by President Jefferson, 
and then made a full report to the attorney general, always being careful “to 
accord to the convict all that he may be fairly entitled to have said in his 
favor.”  The attorney general, having thus been provided with “an impartial 
representation of the case,” then sent the president his recommendation as 
to whether pardon should be granted or not.  If it was “the pleasure of the 
President to grant the pardon asked for,” the attorney general prepared a 
 
36 1880-1881 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 20 (1881). 
37 Lardner, supra note 24, at 509 (quoting from an April 1887 report to “a Select Senate 
Committee interested in how the public business was being conducted,” Report 507, Part 3, 
50th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-23). 
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pardon warrant, which was copied out at the state department, signed by the 
president, and forwarded to the pardon clerk for delivery to its recipient.  If 
the president declined to grant a pardon, the applicant was so informed.38  
By President Cleveland’s second term, it had become the practice for the 
official who was by then called the “pardon attorney”39 to deny petitions 
without sending them on to the president if neither the prosecutor nor the 
judge had recommended favorably.40  In most years, this meant that about 
300 petitions were sent to the president.41 
Beginning in President Cleveland’s first term (1885-1889), the reasons 
for each pardon recommendation were published in the Annual Reports of 
the Attorney General, a practice that would continue until 1931.  The 
attorney general at the time was Augustus Garland, famously the recipient 
of a post-Civil War pardon,42 and he took a personal interest in pardon 
cases.43  During the second Cleveland Administration (1893-1897), the 
President worked directly with the pardon attorney, cutting the attorney 
general out of the process entirely, and wrote out lengthy justifications for 
pardon in more than 714 cases.  President Cleveland’s detailed and highly 
personal reasons for pardon offer a fascinating window into the primitive 




39 In March 1891, the position “clerk of pardons” was redesignated “the attorney in 
charge of pardons,” at which time Congress established the Office of the Pardon Attorney as 
a separate component within the Justice Department.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 541, 26 
Stat. 946.  
40 1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 180 (1897) (Report of the Pardon Attorney) (“[C]ases in 
which neither the United States attorney nor the trial judge recommended clemency are not 
considered by the President unless it is apparent that the health of the convict will be very 
seriously impaired by further confinement.”). 
41 See generally 1885-1931 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1885-1931).  In 1897, for example, 
669 petitions for clemency were received by the Attorney General, of which 334 were sent 
on to the President with a recommendation.  1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 179 (1897).  Of 
those 334 petitions, 224 were granted by the President: 98 unconditional pardons, 5 
conditional pardons, 80 sentence commutations, 31 pardons “for the purpose of restoring 
citizenship,” 5 remissions of fine and 5 respites.  Id.  One hundred and ten petitions were 
denied.  Id. 
42 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1866). 
43 For example, Attorney General Garland expanded the annual reports that the attorneys 
general had been sending to Congress since 1873 to include a full account of each pardon 
grant, and spelling out the justification for his recommendation in each case.  See 1885 
ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1885).  The practice of publishing reasons for each clemency grant 
in the annual report of the attorney general continued until 1932, when it was discontinued at 
the direction of President Roosevelt.  
44 See 1893-1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1893-1897).  Cleveland personally denied 
another 516 cases, allowing more than 750 applications to die without action at the Justice 
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The first formal clemency rules approved by President McKinley in 
1898 incorporated the same basic features that had evolved less formally 
under President Cleveland: all clemency petitions were filed in the first 
instance with the attorney general; the pardon attorney then sent each one 
promptly to the United States Attorney, who was responsible for making a 
recommendation and also soliciting the judge’s; and any pardon application 
that failed to attract official support could be denied by the pardon attorney 
without being sent to the president.45  Given the requirement of a favorable 
recommendation from the prosecutor, it may be surprising (at least to 
anyone accustomed to the present-day hostility of prosecutors toward 
clemency) to see that in most years between 1900 and 1936, more than half 
of the thousands of petitions filed were sent forward to the White House 
 
Department. In several early cases, he made clear his dislike of the primitive federal law of 
murder, which knew no degrees.  See 1885 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 344 (1885) (granting 
commutations to Mason Holcomb, William Dickson, Frederick Ray, and Williams 
Meadows, all sentenced to hang in the District of Arkansas by the notorious hanging judge 
Isaac Parker).  In one case during his second term, President Cleveland explained his 
commutation of Thomas Taylor’s death sentence as follows: 
In disposing of this case I am not able to rest my action upon the far too common allegation of 
insanity, nor upon the theory of accidental or unintentional homicide, both of which pleas have 
been strongly urged on behalf of the convict as well as upon his trial as upon his application for 
Executive clemency.  This commutation is granted upon the ground that, in my opinion, there 
has not been presented in the case such distinct and satisfactory evidence of premeditation as 
should characterize the crime of murder in the first degree, and because I think it can fairly be 
assumed from the facts developed that the discovery by the convict just prior to the homicide of 
the recent and flagrant infidelity of his wife so affected him that he took her life in an instant of 
blind passion and terrible rage.  This case presents another illustration of the desirability of a 
classification of murder into degrees in the District of Columbia, as has been done with good 
results in some of the States. 
1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 182-83 (1896).  In another 1896 case, involving one Eugene 
LeBoeuf, who had been convicted in the Eastern District of New York of sending obscene 
pictures through the mail and sentenced to two years in Kings County penitentiary, the 
President noted that, 
Though I find it exceedingly difficult to extend any measure of clemency in a case involving the 
despicable crime of which this convict was confessedly guilty, yet I think that this is an exceptional 
case of its class.  The convict has already been imprisoned fourteen months, his character prior to 
his arrest was good, and he was of industrious habits; but I confess I am more influenced by the 
sufferings and privations which his longer incarceration would bring upon his innocent and 
dependent wife and child. 
Id. at 190. 
45 See “Rules Relating to Applications for Pardon,” February 3, 1898, at Rules 1, 3, 4 
(signed by President William McKinley and Attorney General John Griggs) (on file with 
Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,) [hereinafter McKinley Rules]; see also 
Kennedy, supra note 9. 
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with a favorable official recommendation.46  At the White House, the 
president usually approved cases recommended favorably by the Attorney 
General, and sometimes was more inclined to leniency.  In 1932, Attorney 
General William Mitchell commented in a speech to the American Bar 
Association on the tension that sometimes arose between Justice 
Department prosecutors, determined to enforce the criminal laws severely, 
and President Hoover, a veteran practitioner of humanitarian relief: 
Reviewing the past three years, I believe that it is in respect to pardons that President 
Hoover has most often shown an inclination to disagree with the Department of 
Justice.  I suspect he thinks we are too rigid.  The pitiful result of criminal misconduct 
is that the burden of misery falls most heavily on the women and children.  If 
executive clemency were granted in all cases of suffering families, the result would be 
a general jail delivery, so we have to steel ourselves against such appeals.  President 
Hoover, with a human sympathy born of his great experiences in the relief of human 
misery, has now and again, not for great malefactors but for humble persons in cases 
you never heard of, been inclined to disagree with the prosecutor’s viewpoint and 
extend mercy.  We have been glad when such incidents occurred.47 
The clemency process also appears to have been extremely efficient, 
judging by the many petitioners who gained release prior to the expiration 
of prison sentences that were measured in months rather than years.48  This 
bears emphasis in light of present-day case backlogs: hundreds of petitions 
were fully processed each year by the pardon attorney and a handful of 
assistants, and promptly decided by the president.49 
The attorney general’s practice of reporting the reasons for each 
clemency recommendation tells a grim story about federal justice in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suggesting that little progress had 
been made toward the humane and efficient system that Enlightenment 
philosophers had expected would eliminate the need for pardon.  At a time 
when basic principles of culpability were still loosely defined, and courts 
had only limited authority to review a jury’s guilty verdict or vary statutory 
penalties,50 pardon performed a variety of important error-correcting and 
 
46 See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 108, tbl.2 (Applications for Clemency Disposed of 
Without the Participation of the President in Relation to the Total Applications Disposed of 
During the Year 1900-1936). 
47 HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 121 (quoting Address, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 
October 13, 1932). 
48 Before the 1920s, it is hard to find a court-imposed prison sentence longer than five 
years in the attorney general’s clemency charts; even in the 1920s, prison sentences as long 
as ten years were relatively infrequent.  See 1885-1931 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1885-1931). 
49 See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 91-92 (describing the allocation of responsibility 
among the seven people in the Office of the Pardon Attorney in 1940, a relatively typical 
year in which 1293 applications were received and 270 grants were issued). 
50 In 1879, circuit courts were empowered to issue writs of error on a discretionary basis, 
Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354, and a variety of procedural devices, including 
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justice-enhancing functions that are nowadays played by courts, and was 
accordingly valued almost as much by prosecutors and judges as it was by 
criminal defendants.51  Indeed, one authority on nineteenth century 
pardoning has concluded, based on archival research and the reasons given 
by the attorney general for recommending pardon, that prosecutors and 
judges relied upon the easy availability of clemency to excuse a somewhat 
less than rigorous attention paid to due process and a hands-off approach to 
jury verdicts.52  Between 1885 and 1931, 181 pardon recommendations 
were based in whole or in part upon “doubt as to guilt,” 52 cited 
“insufficient evidence” to support conviction, 93 announced that grantees 
were innocent or the victims of mistaken identification, and 46 noted the 
“dying confession of the real murderer.”53 
Some reasons given for granting pardon during this period would in 
time become recognized as legal defenses: lack of capacity, duress, 
insanity, and a variety of other mitigating circumstances or excuses that the 
jury had either been unaware of or ignored.  Others reflect operational 
considerations relating to age and health (fear of contagion was as likely as 
imminent death to qualify a prisoner for early release), immigration status 
(to facilitate or avert deportation), or cooperation with the government 
(either to reward it or secure it).  Sometimes pardon was recommended for 
reasons that seem quaint (e.g., “to enable petitioner to catch steamer without 
delay,” “to enable farmer prisoner to save his crops,” “not of criminal 
 
writs of habeas corpus, motions for a new trial, and certificates of division, allowed some 
appellate review even before 1879.  See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right 
to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 531-43 (1992).  In 1889 federal defendants 
sentenced to death gained the right to appeal.  Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 
656.  In 1891, other defendants convicted of serious crimes gained the same right.  Act of 
March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826. 
51 The sympathy of prosecutors toward pardon was replicated in the states.  See, e.g., 
James D. Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon, 17 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490, 
505 (1927) (quoting H. B. Tedrow, State Board of Pardons of Colorado, 1911 Proceedings of 
the Annual Congress of the American Prison Association 300-01) (“I have read dozens of 
communications from judges saying their sentences in specific cases were too severe . . . .  
District attorneys time and again tell us that particular sentences are excessive and thus 
confess that a well-intended prosecution was transformed into an unintended persecution.”). 
52 See Lardner, supra note 24, at 514 (“Many federal prosecutors and judges across the 
country were still accustomed to literal application of the laws that could then be ameliorated 
by recommending a pardon.”).  A similar willingness among eighteenth century English 
judges to impose harsh laws with an expectation of a later pardon has been described by 
Douglas Hay.  Hay, supra note 11, at 23 (“Parliament intended their legislation to be strictly 
enforced, and . . . the judges increasingly vitiated that intention by extending pardons 
freely.”).  See generally 1885-1910 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (reasons given for pardons); 
HUMBERT, supra note 13, at tbls.5 & 6.  
53 HUMBERT, supra note 13, at tbls.5 & 6. 
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type”) or alarming (“mental infirmity of judge”).54  Other frequently cited 
reasons involve the petitioner’s “previous good character,” the destitute 
circumstances of his wife and children, and the reputation and influence of 
those supporting clemency. 
Pardons during this period were also used to signal the need for law 
reform.  In addition to President Wilson’s famous sympathy with liquor law 
violators,55 many acts of clemency prefigured defenses that would 
eventually be enacted into law.  For example, the first federal murder 
statute, part of the initial Federal Criminal Code of 1790, did not divide 
murder into degrees, and it declared the crime punishable by death.56  
Proposals to treat unpremeditated murder as a non-capital offense were 
heeded only in 1909,57 but in the meantime, Presidents Cleveland, Theodore 
Roosevelt, and Taft reviewed the records in capital cases and commuted the 
death sentences of murderers who they concluded had not premeditated 
their crimes.58  A 1939 Justice Department study took note of pardon’s role 
in hastening the development of legal reforms: 
[Pardon] has been the tool by which many of the most important reforms in the 
substantive criminal law have been introduced.  Ancient law was much more static 
and rigid than our own.  As human judgment came to feel that a given legal rule, 
subjecting a person to punishment under certain circumstances, was unjust, almost the 
only available way to avoid the rule was by pardon . . . .  Quickly pardons on such 
grounds became a matter of course; and from there to the recognition of such 
 
54 Id. at 124-33. 
55 See Ruckman, supra note 17. 
56 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 3, reprinted in 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2215 (1970) (declaring 
“wilful murder” “within . . . any . . . place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States” to be punishable by death). 
57 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 273, 275, 35 Stat. 1143.  For one complaint about 
Congress’s failure to divide the crime of murder into degrees, see 1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. 
REP. xvii-xviii (1896). 
58 See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 125 tbl.5.  President Cleveland explained his 1896 
commutation of Thomas Taylor’s death sentence as follows: 
In disposing of this case I am not able to rest my action upon the far too common allegation of 
insanity, nor upon the theory of accidental or unintentional homicide, both of which pleas have 
been strongly urged on behalf of the convict as well as upon his trial as upon his application for 
Executive clemency.  This commutation is granted upon the ground that, in my opinion, there 
has not been presented in the case such distinct and satisfactory evidence of premeditation as 
should characterize the crime of murder in the first degree, and because I think it can fairly be 
assumed from the facts developed that the discovery by the convict just prior to the homicide of 
the recent and flagrant infidelity of his wife so affected him that he took her life in an instant of 
blind passion and terrible rage.  This case presents another illustration of the desirability of the 
classification of murder into degrees in the District of Columbia, as has been done with good 
results in some of the states. 
1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 182-83 (1896). 
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circumstances as a defense was only a short step.  This is what happened with self-
defense, insanity, and infancy, to mention only three well known examples.59 
The range of reasons given for favorable pardon recommendations in 
the attorney general reports reveal not only that pardon functioned as an 
integral part of the justice system, but also that its exercise (much like the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion) was frequently informed by an 
idiosyncratic sense of compassion.  Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte 
observed in 1908 that: 
I have always considered with especial care the possible claims to clemency of 
unenlightened and apparently friendless criminals, particularly those whose crimes 
might have been the fruits of sudden and violent passion, ignorance, poverty, or 
unhappy surroundings and to deal less favorably with applications on behalf of 
offenders enjoying at the time of the crime good social position, material comforts, 
the benefits of education, and a happy domestic life. 60 
In 1897, Grover Cleveland’s very last pardon went to a postal thief 
who he opined was “not entitled to the least clemency.”61  However, the 
prisoner had “a wife and 8 children who are in a destitute condition, and the 
situation is made more pitiable by the fact that the wife has lately had a 
stroke of paralysis, from which there is no hope of her recovery.”62  Noting 
that a job awaited the prisoner that would enable him to care for his family, 
the President declared, “[T]his pardon is granted solely on their account.”63 
The number of grants each year is staggering in light of the relatively 
small number of federal defendants.  The Annual Reports of the Attorney 
General for the years between 1885 and 1930 reveal that the presidents 
issued more than 10,000 grants of clemency during this forty-five-year 
 
59 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE 
PROCEDURES: PARDON 295-96 (1939) [hereinafter 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES]. 
60 1908 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 8 (1908).  Unfortunately, after 1931 these fascinating 
records were no longer compiled and published, ostensibly for reasons of efficiency but 
more likely because of President Roosevelt’s preference for confidentiality in the pardon 
process, and they exist now only in the uncatalogued letters of advice signed by the Attorney 
General available from the National Archives and Records Administration. 
61 1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 187-88 (1896). 
62 Id. 
63 1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 187-88 (1897); see also id. at 191, granting commutation 
to an individual convicted of counterfeiting and sentenced to six months in prison: 
The sentence of his convict was so unaccountably lenient and his guilt was so clear that no 
consideration arising out of the facts of the case as they are related to the convict himself would 
incline me to interfere with his punishment. 
 I can not, however, close my heart to the distressing representation that very lately and since the 
imprisonment of the convict his wife has died, leaving motherless a large family of small 
children, one of them an infant a few weeks old.  The pardon is granted solely on their account, 
and in the hope that the release of their father will relieve their destitute and forlorn condition. 
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period, frequently more than 300 per year.  More than three-quarters of the 
grants issued before 1910 went to petitioners seeking to reduce or avoid a 
prison term,64 and post-sentence pardons “to restore civil rights” amounted 
to less than 20% of all grants.65  After 1910, most grants to prisoners were 
styled “sentence commutation,” replacing the full or conditional pardon 
more frequently used in earlier years to release a person from a prison term.  
After 1930, post-sentence pardons “to restore civil rights” became the most 
frequent form of relief, as parole displaced pardon as the primary 
mechanism for early release.66 
Pardoning throughout this period was a regular part of the 
housekeeping business of the presidency.  Pardons were granted frequently 
and generously at regular intervals over the course of each president’s term, 
with no slow starts and no bunching of grants at the end.67  Indeed, between 
1902 and 1933 there was only one month in which not a single pardon was 
granted, the month before Warren Harding’s fatal 1923 heart attack.68  
Sheer volume protected the president’s ability to make an occasional grant 
for personal or political reasons that the public might otherwise not 
understand, and the low-key routine of the pardon program was “of such a 
character as not to attract wide attention.”69  In addition to the generous 
 
64 While most grants to prisoners prior to 1895 were simply styled “pardon,” after that 
time official reports categorized grants in a variety of ways.  For example, between 1895 and 
1904, presidents granted 871 unconditional pardons, 101 conditional pardons, 552 
commutations, 6 conditional commutations, 362 pardons “to restore civil rights,” and 89 
miscellaneous grants of reprieve, respite, and remission of fine.  See 1895-1904 ATT’Y GEN. 
ANN. REP. (1895-1904).  By the 1920s, the number of full pardons had declined to about 
10% of the total, and most grants were described either as “commutation of sentence” or 
“pardon to restore civil rights.”  For the decade between 1920 and 1929, the presidents 
issued 1764 commutations, 1239 pardons to restore civil rights, and only 203 full pardons.  
See 1920-1929 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1920-1929). 
65 See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 100-01.  Between Reconstruction and 1895, there 
were few pardons granted to people who were neither imprisoned nor threatened with prison, 
simply “to restore civil rights.”  After 1895, however, “the President disclosed consistently 
and impressively an inclination toward this form of clemency.”  Id. at 101. 
66 The final simplification of the grant typology into two types of grants (commutation 
for prisoners and pardon for those who had fully served their sentence) was not 
accomplished until the 1962 clemency rules.  However, after 1930 there were few pardons 
granted to anyone who was still under sentence.  The term “commutation” itself did not 
appear in the clemency rules until 1962. 
67 Graphs and tables showing pardon grant patterns from 1900 through 2001, based on 
data from the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon Attorney, can be found in P.S. 
RUCKMAN, JR., supra note 4, at 15-27.  The practice of regular monthly pardoning continued 
under Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Truman, but became less regular beginning with 
President Eisenhower.  Id. at 23-24. 
68 See Ruckman, supra note 17, at 16-18 figs.1-9. 
69 HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 5. 
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grant rate, it was the thoroughness and perceived fairness of the Justice 
Department’s review that guaranteed public confidence in the process and 
protected the president’s ability to exercise his discretion as he thought best.  
Ensuring a central role in the pardon process to those officially responsible 
for the underlying criminal case gave the president access to information 
about the case, and in addition helped insulate the president from political 
pressure and importuning.   
This system had important benefits not just for the presidency, but for 
the justice system itself.  Until the 1950s, the president personally signed 
hundreds of separate pardon warrants each year, and until the 1980s the 
attorney general personally signed hundreds of separate letters of advice 
describing each case and stating the reasons for clemency.70  In this way, 
both officials spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the end-
product of their justice system.  Whatever the efficiencies of such a system, 
probably unthinkable today, it maximized the chances that pardon would 
advance the administration’s criminal justice agenda. 
C. PARDON GIVES BIRTH TO PAROLE: 1910-1930 
In 1910, a statutory parole system was introduced at the three then-
existing federal penitentiaries,71 beginning the process whereby the pardon 
power would be used less frequently to free prisoners and more commonly 
to restore rights to those who had served their sentences and spent a period 
of time in the free community.72  Other sentencing alternatives introduced 
 
70 President Eisenhower began the practice of signing a “master” warrant listing the 
names of all pardon beneficiaries, and authorizing the Attorney General (later the Deputy 
Attorney General, and still later the Pardon Attorney) to prepare and sign individual warrants 
for delivery to the individual beneficiary.  See Warrants of Pardon (on file in Office of the 
Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice). 
71 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819; see U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, HISTORY OF 
THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 6-7 (2003), available at http://www.fedcure.org/ 
information/TheHistoryOfTheFederalParoleSystem-2003.pdf.  
72 Pardon’s performance of a paroling function in the nineteenth century federal justice 
system, and its gradual displacement by a statutory prison release procedure and sentencing 
alternatives in the early twentieth century, was mirrored in most of the states.  See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 4 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PAROLE 
52-53 (1939) [hereinafter 4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES]. 
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around this time similarly reduced the demands on pardon,73 though they 
did not immediately depress the demand for clemency.74 
The familial relationship between pardon and parole was reflected in 
the fact that the two forms of early release were initially administered 
together.  Between 1910 and 1930, the attorney general reviewed both 
pardon applications and the recommendations of the three institutional 
parole boards that the 1910 act created (one in each of the three federal 
penitentiaries).  In 1919 and again in 1920, Attorney General A. Mitchell 
Palmer complained that the task of reviewing parole and pardon cases had 
become so onerous that it was “practically impossible for him to give to 
these cases the thought and attention they require,” and proposed 
transferring jurisdiction over both pardon and parole cases to a three-person 
board.75  For that reason, he urged the creation of a separate federal agency 
to handle all pardon and parole cases, and to manage the federal prison 
system.  In the late 1920s, parole cases were staffed through the pardon 
attorney’s office, further evidence that the two forms of relief were 
originally considered complementary if not interchangeable.76  Finally, in 
1930 Congress created the U.S. Board of Parole and gave it authority to 
approve all paroles, thus relieving the attorney general of responsibility for 
administering the new system of indeterminate sentences, though he 
remained personally responsible for clemency cases.77  Two years later, the 
 
73 The growing number of appeals in non-capital cases reduced the number of prisoner 
petitions seeking to correct error in the district court, while the authorization of probation in 
1923 gave a sentencing alternative to judges not inclined to impose a prison term.  In 1926, 
the attorney general reported that the availability of probation had eliminated “a large 
number of [clemency] applications involving offenses of a trivial nature.”  1926 ATT’Y GEN. 
ANN. REP. 117 (1926). 
74 Between the start of 1900 and the end of 1909, presidents approved 1,518 grants of 
clemency; between the start of 1910 and the end of 1919 (the first decade of the statute’s 
operation), they approved 2,534 grants; and between the start of 1920 and the end of 1929, 
they approved 3,588 grants.  HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 97-99 (Table I: Applications for 
Clemency and the Disposition Made of Them).  Federal liquor prohibition accounted for 
much of the increase.  In 1930, the pardon attorney estimated that 70% of his budget was 
devoted to processing prohibition cases.  Id. at 92 n.18. 
75 1919 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 4 (1919).  The report further states: 
It appears desirable that a board be created for the purpose of passing upon and recommending 
action to the President in pardon cases and for the purpose of finally approving paroles granted 
by the parole boards established at institutions where Federal prisoners are confined.  It is 
recommended that a board of three men be constituted and fully empowered to handle this work.  
The jurisdiction over Federal penal institutions should also be vested in this board. 
See also 1920 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 6-7 (1920).  The language used in the 1920 report is 
identical to that of the 1919 report.   
76 See 1928 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 78 (1928); 1929 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 79 (1929). 
77 See U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, supra note 71, at 7.  The same year, Congress also created 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, whose first director was Sanford Bates.  See Paul W. Keve, At 
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attorney general described how the number of parole releases had 
burgeoned.78  By the end of the 1930s, parole had largely supplanted 
clemency as a means of releasing prisoners.  While there were still several 
dozen commutations granted each year, many were simply to the minimum 
term so that the recipient might be eligible for parole.79 
In the beginning, parole was not seen as theoretically distinct from 
pardon, but rather simply a more efficient way of administering the old 
system.80  Before long, however, different theoretical justifications 
developed for the two forms of early release: pardon was seen as an end to 
punishment as a gesture of mercy, while parole was considered a 
continuation of punishment in the community and intended to rehabilitate.81  
To most students of criminal justice, the substitution of parole for pardon 
appeared to be progress.  Yet the origins of the former in the latter led to 
some doctrinal and operational confusion, perpetuated by the joint 
administration of the two authorities in most of the states.82  In 1939, the 
 
the Mercy of the States, in ESCAPING PRISON MYTHS 25, 33 (John W. Roberts ed., 1994).  
Bates and the Bureau’s second director, James V. Bennett, managed the difficult transition to 
a centralized federal prison system.  Id. at 33-35.  See generally JAMES V. BENNETT, I CHOSE 
PRISON (1970). 
78 1932 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 127 (1932).  
Since 1910 when the Federal parole act became effective, the number of prisoners released 
annually on parole from the Federal institutions has grown from 133 in 1910-11 to 5,207 in 
1931-32.  The increase has been especially rapid during the past few years.  Parole release 
numbered 1,069 in 1928-29, 2,536 in 1929-30, and 4,566 in 1930-31.  Thus the number paroled 
in 1931-32 was more than five times as large as the number paroled three years previously, and 
more than twice as large as the number paroled two years previously.  The number of parole 
releases has also increased more rapidly than the prison population . . . .  Parole releases in 1910-
11 numbered only 6.4 per 100 of the prison population . . . while parole releases in 1931-32 
numbered 38 per 100 of the prison population . . . . 
Id.  The numbers reported in this passage do not include federal prisoners paroled from state 
institutions.  The 1910 statute empowered state boards to release federal prisoners housed in 
state institutions on the same terms as other inmates of these facilities (although it also 
empowered the Attorney General to veto the paroles approved by state boards).  Cf. id. 
79 See OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1900-1945, supra note 4. 
80 Parole apparently was originally introduced in some states not for any new interest in 
encouraging rehabilitation, but for a similar desire to relieve administrative burdens.  See, 
e.g., Sheldon L. Messinger et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 69, 69 (1985) (“Parole was introduced in California, and used for over a decade, 
primarily to relieve governors of part of the burden of exercising clemency to reduce the 
excessive sentences of selected state prisoners.”). 
81 See 4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 72, at 2-3. 
82 Even as late as 1939, in eighteen states, pardons and paroles were granted by the 
governor or by a clemency board that sometimes included the governor.  (In six of these 
states the courts had held parole to be in derogation of the governor’s constitutional pardon 
power.)  4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 72, at 44-54.  In another nine states 
the governor was advised in pardon matters by the parole board.  See id.  The shared 
1190 MARGARET COLGATE LOVE [Vol. 100 
Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures observed that “[m]uch of 
the present trouble with the administration of parole arises from the fact that 
parole is granted as though it were a pardon.”83  Indeed, to the extent that 
substantial rehabilitation was and still is considered a basis for clemency, it 
may be that there has always been a much closer kinship between the two 
forms of relief than the theoreticians have been willing to admit.84  All the 
same, the authors of the 1939 Survey were confident that the availability of 
parole would limit pardon’s role in the justice system: “Are not judicial 
review and modern release procedures like parole sufficient to do all that 
pardon ever did—and do it better?  To a large extent the answer must be 
yes.”85  After the federal experiment with parole was abandoned in 1984, 
and a system of determinate sentences reinstated, some scholars anticipated 
that pardon would once again claim a useful role,86 though to date this has 
not happened. 
D. PARDON IN THE AGE OF INDETERMINACY, 1930-1980 
The 1898 McKinley rules87 contemplated that pardon would be the 
relief sought by individuals faced with or already serving a prison sentence, 
and mentioned almost as an afterthought pardon “merely” to restore civil 
rights.  But after 1931, the existence of an independent paroling authority 
and indeterminate sentencing limited the role of clemency as a prison 
release mechanism, and post-sentence pardons became by far the most 
frequent form of clemency.  Franklin Roosevelt granted more than 3,000 
post-sentence pardons during his thirteen years in office, but only 488 
commutations; Truman granted more than 1,900 pardons (including 141 “to 
 
administrative framework has continued to the present in two-thirds of the states (although 
Oklahoma is the only state where the governor still must approve all paroles).  See LOVE, 
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 23-36. 
83 4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 72, at 53. 
84 Standards for clemency and parole frequently the same, and parole has been held to 
have similar discretionary attributes.  Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 
(1981) (“A commutation decision . . . shares some of the characteristics of a decision 
whether to grant parole.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 293 (1980) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “parole is simply an act of executive grace”).  However, despite the 
necessarily subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release decision, state statutes may 
create liberty interests in parole release that are entitled to protection under the Due Process 
Clause.  See Greeholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 
U.S. 1 (1979).  
85 See 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 59, at 296. 
86 See MOORE, supra note 16, at 86 (speculating that the abolition of federal parole could 
lead to “an expanded and crucial role for pardons”). 
87 See McKinley Rules, supra note 45. 
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avert deportation”)88 but only 118 commutations; Eisenhower granted 1,100 
pardons and 47 commutations.  Later presidents also commuted few 
sentences.89 
The administration of the pardon power also changed, becoming less 
transparent after the attorney general stopped publishing the reasons for his 
pardon recommendations in 1932.90  For the next twenty-five years, 
published reports of the pardon attorney contained only bare case statistics, 
and between 1941 and 1955 no reports were published at all.91   
In 1958 a new pardon attorney produced a detailed report confirming a 
simplified classification scheme for clemency grants: commutation was an 
“extraordinary” remedy for prisoners seeking reduction of sentence, while 
pardon was reserved for those who had served their sentence and were 
seeking “forgiveness for the purpose of restoring their good names, 
removing the stigma of conviction, or securing the restoration of such rights 
as may have been lost by virtue of the convictions.”92  Also, during the 
1950s a number of federal employees sought pardon to avoid losing their 
 
88 See typescript Reports of the Pardon Attorney’s Office, 1946-1952 (available from the 
Office of the Pardon Attorney and on file with author).  Between 1962 and 1993, the 
clemency rules specifically provided for a waiver of the eligibility waiting period “in cases 
of aliens seeking a pardon to avert deportation.”  See 28 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1963); 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 
(1985). 
89 One notable exception was a rare systematic use of the pardon power in the 1960s, 
when Presidents Kennedy and Johnson commuted the sentences of more than 300 drug 
offenders serving mandatory minimum sentences under the Narcotics Control Act of 1956.  
See 1963 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 62-63 (1963); 1964 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 64 (1964); see 
also Shanor & Miller, supra note 17, at 142. 
90 See supra note 43. 
91 Typescript reports of the pardon attorney from 1941 through 1955 are available from 
the Office of the Pardon Attorney, and are on file with the author. 
92 See 1958 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1958) 43-44.  Only about fifteen commutation 
applications were filed each year from 1953 through 1958, usually seeking release because 
of critical illness, or “some extraordinary reasons why the President should be called upon to 
act rather than wait for statutory provisions to take care of the situation.”  Id. at 43.  As to 
pardon, 
[t]he majority of applicants for pardon give various reasons for seeking clemency.  Some 
examples are: The substantial businessman who seeks a pardon of the offense committed more 
than 25 years ago in order to remove the stigma from the names of his grandchildren; the young 
man who robbed a bank during his teenage years, learned a dental technician trade while in 
prison, studied dentistry upon release, and needed a pardon to secure a professional dentist’s 
license; the real estate broker who moved from one state on account of his wife’s health and 
found that he needed a pardon in order to receive a broker’s license in the new state; the young 
man who felt he needed a pardon to help him secure employment; and elderly men and women 
who seek to clear their  names before they die. 
Id. at 45. 
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pensions under the Smith Act.93  The pardon attorney reported that more 
than 400 petitions for pardon had been filed each year between 1954 and 
1958, adding that “150 old cases [were] reactivated each year.”94  Only 
about 25% of all petitions were sent forward to the president with the 
attorney general’s favorable recommendation, though it appears that all of 
these were granted.95 
Clemency practice changed again during the Kennedy Administration, 
when revised clemency rules directed the attorney general to send a report 
and recommendation to the White House in every case filed with the 
Department of Justice.96  This resulted in a lot more work for the pardon 
attorney’s small staff and a higher grant rate for post-sentence pardons over 
the next twenty years: the percentage of pardon petitions acted on favorably 
by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter varied between 
30% and 40%, a significantly higher grant rate than under earlier presidents, 
when substantial numbers of petitions were being denied administratively 
by the Justice Department without ever being sent to the president.  While 
grants to prisoners were less frequent because of the availability of parole, 
an average of 150 post-sentence pardons were issued each year between 
1960 and 1980.97  Still, pardoning remained a routine and relatively low-
key activity of the presidency that took place largely unnoticed.  Perhaps 
more than anything else, it was the regularity and accessibility of the 
administrative process that maintained a level of public confidence in 
 
93 Id. (“An increasing number of Government employees, with records of past 
convictions, apply for pardons necessitated by Public Law 769, 83rd Congress.  This Act 
denies retirement annuity benefits to employees convicted of certain crimes unless pardons 
are granted.”). 
94 Id. at 44. 
95 Id. 
96 See 28 C.F.R. Part 1 (1963); 27 Fed. Reg. 11002 (Oct. 30, 1962).  These regulations 
also formalized the simplified grant typology announced in the 1958 report of the pardon 
attorney. 
97 See OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1.  It is hard to be precise 
about the grant rate for post-sentence pardons before President Nixon’s first term, because 
the pardon attorney statistical reports do not break out petitions received and denied by type 
of relief until 1967.  That said, Franklin Roosevelt granted 27.8% of all clemency petitions 
acted upon during his tenure, Truman granted 41.5%, Eisenhower granted 26.7%, and 
Kennedy granted 40.9%.  (In light of the fact that Eisenhower commuted only forty-seven 
sentences in eight years, it is likely that his 1110 pardons represent more than 30% of the 
total number of pardon petitions acted on during his two terms.)  Nixon granted 51% of the 
pardon petitions acted on during his tenure, and 26.3% of pardon and commutation petitions 
combined; Ford granted 39% of pardon petitions and 31.2% overall; and Carter granted 34% 
of pardon petitions and 21.6% overall.  Id. 
2010] THE TWILIGHT OF THE PARDON POWER 1193 
pardoning, which in turn protected the president from being suspected of 
abusing his power.98  That was all about to change. 
III. PUBLIC MERCY IN THE CRIME WAR: 1980 TO THE PRESENT 
A. PARDON’S PERFECT STORM 
After 1980, presidential pardoning went into a decline.  In part this 
was because the retributivist theory of “just deserts” and the politics of the 
“war on crime” together made pardon seem at the same time useless and 
dangerous.  For retributivists, the “essentially lawless” exercise of mercy 
seemed a “threat to society dedicated to the rule of law.”99  The architects of 
the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act stripped all discretionary relief 
mechanisms out of the law, even the modest set-aside remedy of the Youth 
Corrections Act.100  There was no place for pardon in such a system. 
Contemporaneous with the ascendency of retributivism in punishment 
theory, crime control became a central issue in American politics.101  It 
became conventional wisdom that appearing “soft on crime” could only get 
an elected official into trouble, and the Willie Horton episode during the 
 
98 It is no accident that the president tended to get in trouble with pardons only when he 
failed to utilize the Justice Department’s pardon process.  See Walter Trohan, Bridges Seeks 
to End Secrecy in U.S. Pardons, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Aug. 30, 1953, at 10 (President Truman 
accused of cronyism in pardoning seven current or former government officials on his way 
out of office, without Justice Department advice). 
99 AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION 69 (2005).  
The retributivist philosophers whose ideas eventually triumphed in the 1984 Sentencing 
Reform Act took a dim view of unruly pardon, considering it an unprincipled and 
unwelcome intrusion in the law’s enlightened process.  See MOORE, supra note 16, at 28-34, 
84.  Utilitarian theory also had no use for pardon, believing that “clemency is a virtue which 
ought to shine in the code, and not in private judgment.”  Id. at 39 (citing C.B. BECCARIA, AN 
ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 158-59 (1953)).  Moore herself espouses a retributivist 
view of pardon as “an act of justice rather than an act of mercy.”  Id. at 129; see also id. at 
213 (arguing that “a justified pardon is one that corrects injustice rather than tempers justice 
with mercy”).  Moore’s retributivist theory of pardon is compared with Jeffrie Murphy’s 
theory of “public mercy” in Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar 
Buttons: Reflections on the President’s Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 
1500-09 (2000). 
100 Perhaps inadvertently, in ridding the legal system of discretionary relief provisions 
like parole, Congress left a key residual role for clemency as “fail safe.”  Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (quoting MOORE, supra note 16, at 131). 
101 James Vorenberg, Executive Director of President Johnson’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, commented on the growing threat of crime in 
a 1972 piece in The Atlantic, opining that “during the past five years the frustration of poor 
people and minorities with continued denial of opportunities to improve their lives by lawful 
means has made reliance on crime an increasingly acceptable alternative.”  James 
Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, THE ATLANTIC, May 1972, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/ crimewar.htm. 
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1988 presidential campaign confirmed that pardoning could ruin a political 
career.102  As pardoning became less frequent, the inherent mystery of the 
pardon process reinforced in the public’s mind the popular myth that pardon 
is available only to those with money and connections, a way for a 
president to reward intimates at the end of his term.  This would become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
But perhaps the most important negative influence on presidential 
pardoning was the hostility of federal prosecutors and a change in the 
administration of the pardon program at the Justice Department that 
allowed prosecutors to control clemency recommendations.  Historically, 
the attorney general’s clemency recommendations had reflected his dual 
role as political counselor and chief law enforcement officer.  Attorney 
General Griffin Bell’s decision in the late 1970s to delegate responsibility 
for making clemency recommendations to officials responsible for 
prosecution policy eliminated this institutional ambivalence, transforming 
the general tenor of the advice the president would receive from the Justice 
Department from the 1980s onwards.103  No longer did the Justice 
Department feel its old obligation “to accord to the convict all that he may 
be fairly entitled to have said in his favor.”104  Instead, it treated every 
clemency petition as a potential challenge to the law enforcement policies 
underlying the conviction.105  Once pardon policy became part and parcel of 
 
102 See generally DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA (1995).  
Another danger was that a particular grant might be distorted and give a mistaken impression 
of the Administration’s commitment to crime control.  For example, after President Bush 
pardoned a particularly deserving and well-known individual who had been convicted of a 
minor marijuana possession offense thirty years before, the grant was characterized as 
“especially ironic, given the administration’s current push to enact tougher penalties on drug 
offenders . . . .”  Tom Watson, In Rare Move, Bush Pardons Drug Offender; Civic Service, 
Campaign Win Forgiveness for Harlem Globetrotter, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1; see 
also Pardon Me, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at 3 (quoting Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa.: “I don’t 
know how you can champion yourself in the debate on drug use when you pardon drug 
dealers.”). 
103 See Love, supra note 17, at 7-8. 
104 See supra note 36. 
105 In the Reagan Administration, the pardon attorney described his office’s more 
“exacting” scrutiny of pardon applications “to better reflect the administration’s philosophy 
toward crime.”  Pete Earley, Presidents Set Own Rules on Granting Clemency, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 19, 1984, at A17; see also Larry Margasak, Any Pardons Would Come After Election 
Day, Observers Say, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 18, 1988 (“[T]he administration’s use of career 
prosecutors to screen pardon requests has resulted in a natural inclination for tighter 
scrutiny.”).  All but a handful of the individuals officially responsible for approving Justice 
Department clemency recommendations since 1983 have been former federal prosecutors.  
See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Practice of 
Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 126 n.23 (2001).  As a practical matter, Justice 
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a tough-on-crime agenda, pardon practice served primarily to ratify the 
results achieved by prosecutors, not to provide any real possibility of 
revising them.  With very little independent interest at the White House in 
the routine work of pardoning, it was inevitable that the number and 
frequency of clemency grants would steadily decline through the 1980s. 
B. THE CLINTON MELTDOWN 
At the beginning of the Clinton Administration, the effects of 
mandatory sentencing and the abolition of parole swelled commutation 
filings.106  Yet President Clinton was disinclined to pardon: apart from the 
risk of making a mistake, he did not want to be outflanked by Republicans 
on criminal justice issues.107  Breaking from past practice, he issued no 
clemency grants at all in four of the first five years of his presidency and 
allowed the Justice Department’s clemency recommendations to pile up at 
the White House without action.108  During his second term, a number of 
high profile clemency cases were handled entirely by the White House 
Counsel, an unprecedented public distancing from the Justice Department’s 
pardon program.109  As a result, President Clinton entered his final year in 
 
Department pardon policy and practice has been controlled since 1997 by David Margolis, a 
career prosecutor on the staff of the Deputy Attorney General. 
106 To manage the caseload, the Pardon Attorney was directed by the Office of the 
Deputy Attorney General to prepare summary reports recommending denial of clemency in 
all cases except those in which a Member of Congress or the White House had expressed an 
interest.  See Memorandum from Roger Adams to Margaret Love (Oct. 23, 1993) (on file 
with author).  While this directive was later retracted, its spirit continued to inform the 
Justice Department’s administration of the pardon power.  Of the sixty-one commutations 
granted by President Clinton during his eight years in office, no more than a handful were 
favorably recommended by the Justice Department.  Several of these were requested by 
prosecutors to fix their mistake.  See, e.g., Exec. Grant of Clemency to Johnny Palacios, 
Aug. 21, 1995 (on file with Office of the Pardon Attorney) (cooperator for whom prosecutor 
had neglected to timely file a sentence reduction motion); Exec. Grant of Clemency to Alain 
Orozco, July 5, 2001, discussed in David M. Zlotnick, Federal Prosecutors and the 
Clemency Power, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 168, 169 (2001). 
107 See, e.g., Marc Mauer, The Fragility of Criminal Justice Reform, 21 SOC. JUST. 14, 21 
(1994) (describing Clinton’s effort to “‘take the crime issue away’ from Republicans”); Tony 
G. Poveda, Clinton, Crime and the Justice Department, 21 SOC. JUST. 73, 75 (1994) (“[I]n 
the Clinton era . . . ideas that are outside the scope of the current ideological hegemony of 
‘get tough’ crime policies will be selectively ignored or silenced.”). 
108 See OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1; see also Margaret 
Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons from Clinton’s Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 185, 196 n.38 (2003) [hereinafter Love, Paradox] (describing irregular consideration of 
pardons at the White House throughout the Clinton presidency). 
109 See THE PARDON ATTORNEY REFORM AND INTEGRITY ACT, S. REP. NO. 106-231, at 8 
(2000) (commutation of sixteen Puerto Rican terrorists without Justice Department advice); 
see also Darryl W. Jackson et al., Bending Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon of 
Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251 (1999) (describing Pardon Attorney’s 
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office having pardoned less generously than any president since John 
Adams.110  By that time, discouraged by the President’s apparent lack of 
interest, the Justice Department had effectively stopped producing pardon 
recommendations. 
As the time on his watch grew short, in the fall of 2000 another side of 
President Clinton emerged.  He took every opportunity to talk to the press 
about pardons, lamenting how few he had granted, and signaling an 
intention to do more before leaving office.111  For the first time in eight 
years, he expressed sympathy with nonviolent drug offenders serving long 
prison terms,112 and articulated a generous policy of restoring civil rights to 
anyone who had completed his sentence.113  At the eleventh hour, President 
Clinton recognized how meager his overall pardoning record was compared 
to that of his predecessors, notably President Reagan, and resolved to make 
up for lost time.  But by that time, despite repeated urging by White House 
staffers, the Justice Department was either unwilling or unable to meet the 
President’s desire for more pardon recommendations.  In October of 2000, 
 
refusal to docket posthumous pardon application on behalf of first black West Point 
graduate). 
110 See Love, Paradox, supra note 108, at 196 (citing P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Federal 
Executive Clemency in the United States, 1789-1995: A Preliminary Report (Nov. 1995) 
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa, 
Florida, on file with author)). 
111 See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Ceremony Appointing Roger 
Gregory to an Interim Seat on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (Dec. 27, 2000), reprinted 
in 13 FED. SENT. REP. 228 (2000) [hereinafter Gregory Remarks] (“I wish I could do some 
more [pardons]—I’m going to try. I’m trying to get it out of the system that exists, that 
existed before I got here, and I’m doing the best I can.”).  Newsweek reported an incident in 
early January in which the President wandered into the press section of Air Force One on a 
trip to Arkansas and asked “You got anybody you want to pardon?”  Weston Kosova, 
Backstage at the Finale, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 30. 
112 Jan Wenner, Bill Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 28, 
2000, at 98 (“We really need a reexamination of our entire policy on imprisonment. . . . [A] 
lot of people are in prison today because they have drug problems or alcohol problems. . . . I 
think the sentences in many cases are too long for nonviolent offenders. . . . I think 
[mandatory minimum sentences] should be reexamined.”).  
113 Gregory Remarks, supra note 111, at 228: 
I have always thought that Presidents and governors . . . should be quite conservative on 
commutations—that is, there needs to be a very specific reason if you reduce someone’s 
sentence or let them out—but more broad-minded about pardons because, in so many states in 
America, pardons are necessary to restore people’s rights of citizenship.  Particularly if they 
committed relatively minor offenses, or if some years have elapsed and they’ve been good 
citizens and there’s no reason to believe they won’t be good citizens in the future, I think we 
ought to give them a chance, having paid the price, to be restored to full citizenship. 
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Pardon Attorney Roger Adams was directed to advise pardon-seekers to 
press their suits directly with the White House.114 
With the clemency review process in the Justice Department 
effectively sidelined by its own choice, the President set up an ad hoc 
procedure in the White House Counsel’s office to identify suitable 
candidates for pardon and commutation.  He did not have to go far to find 
candidates after his intentions became public.  Throughout the fall of 2000, 
pardon-seekers besieged the President and his staff for a final favor, so that 
pardon matters occupied the attention of even the most senior White House 
staff.115  Rumors flew about deals and promises involving pardons, 
influential insiders were retained to argue otherwise hopeless cases, and the 
press speculated about who was and who was not likely to be a beneficiary 
of Clinton’s end-of-term largesse.116  By their own account, during the final 
weeks White House staff at all levels worked around the clock compiling 
and revising lists of pardon applicants, fielding calls from influential 
 
114 The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich: Hearings Before the 
H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. 342-43 (2001) [hereinafter House 
Hearings] (testimony of Beth Nolan, Counsel to former President Clinton, describing 
unresponsive Justice Department pardon process at the conclusion of the Clinton 
Administration, and the ensuing frantic effort at the White House in the final weeks to 
process the hundreds of clemency requests coming directly to the White House); see also 
Love, Paradox, supra note 108, at 191-97 (describing run-up to final Clinton pardons, the 
failure of the Justice Department pardon process, staffing of pardons in the White House, 
and the grants themselves). 
115 House Hearings, supra note 114, at 342-43.  Ms. Nolan reported that in the final 
weeks the White House was “inundated” with pardon requests, and importuned by 
influential people, including members of Congress, about particular cases: 
They were coming from everywhere . . . .  We had requests from members of Congress on both 
sides of the aisle and both Houses.  We had requests from movie stars, newscasters, former 
Presidents, former first ladies.  There wasn’t anybody—I refused to go to holiday parties because 
I couldn’t stand being—nobody wanted to know how I was, thank you very much. They wanted 
to know about a pardon.  So I just didn’t go. 
Id.  A chart distributed by the Department of Justice to members of the press on February 13, 
2001, reveals that upwards of thirty of the recipients of pardon or commutation on January 
20 filed applications with the Justice Department in the final weeks (or even days) days of 
President Clinton’s term, leaving no time for them to be considered in the ordinary course.  
A like number did not file applications with the Department at all.  The chart, which was 
never published and is untitled, is on file with author. 
116 See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald & Michael Moss, Rising Number Sought Pardons in Last 2 
Years, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at A1; Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Rush of Pardons 
Unusual in Scope, Lack of Scrutiny; Back-Door Lobbying Had Large Role in Clinton’s 
Decisions, Observers Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at A3; Don Van Natta Jr. & Marc 
Lacey, Access Proved Vital in the Race to Secure a Pardon from Clinton, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 
25, 2001, at A1.  The atmosphere at the White House in the final weeks was likened by 
former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to a “Middle Eastern bazaar.”  Love, Paradox, 
supra note 108, at 199 n.44. 
1198 MARGARET COLGATE LOVE [Vol. 100 
supporters, and attending meetings at which the merits of pardon cases were 
debated, for the most part without input from the Justice Department.117  All 
of the ordinarily applicable standards and procedures went by the boards in 
the frenzy of back-door lobbying by Clinton friends and family.118  In his 
drive to create an entire legacy overnight, the President gave pardoning a 
place on his agenda alongside the Middle East peace negotiations and the 
independent counsel’s inquiry into his own conduct.  Relieved of the 
constraints imposed by the Justice Department’s administration of the 
power, he enjoyed a final unencumbered opportunity to reward friends, 
bless strangers, and settle old scores. 
As President Clinton’s final day in office approached, many in 
Washington were braced for some last minute surprises.  But no one was 
quite prepared for the 177 grants announced on the morning of January 20 
just before the new president was to take the oath of office, which were 
unprecedented in number and in kind.  The Pardon Attorney, who had been 
up all night as the White House continued to add names to (or subtract them 
from) the list of beneficiaries, told a reporter that he didn’t even know who 
many of the people were or how to reach them to inform them of their good 
fortune.119  Some of the grants were immediately identifiable as personal 
gestures to friends and family,120 and some were evidently aimed at nailing 
 
117 See House Hearings, supra note 114.  In the summer of 2002, the House Committee 
on Government Reform published a three-volume report on its investigation into the final 
Clinton pardons, which focuses on a dozen or so of the most controversial cases. See 
generally JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE, H.R. REP. 
NO. 107-454 (2002) [hereinafter JUSTICE UNDONE].  See also id. at 1309-20 (describing 
White House staff handling of the Carlos Vignali petition); id. at 1195-1231, 1468-71, 1686-
1707 (charts prepared by White House staff noting support for particular clemency 
applicants). 
118 For a colorful account by a member of the loyal opposition, including a representative 
sampling of the extensive contemporary press coverage, see BARBARA OLSON, THE FINAL 
DAYS 113-93 (2001).  For further discussion of the final grants, see Love, supra note 114, at 
188-93 (2003). 
119 See Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 17, at A1.  Mr. Adams reported that some 
requests from the White House arrived so late in the evening on Friday that his office did not 
have time to conduct record checks with the FBI.  Among the names his office received for 
the first time on the night of January 19 were the President’s brother, Roger Clinton, and 
Richard Riley Jr., the son of Clinton’s Secretary of Education.  Id.  Three weeks later, Mr. 
Adams again described the harrowing final hours in testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  See Recent Presidential Pardons: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Roger C. Adams, Pardon Attorney). 
120 The President pardoned his brother Roger Clinton’s 1985 cocaine trafficking 
conviction, but did not pardon any of the individuals Roger Clinton had reportedly 
recommended.  See JUSTICE UNDONE, supra note 117, at 709-831; see also infra note 124, 
for description of grants to long-time friends Fife Symington and Paul Prosperi. 
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shut the coffin of the Independent Counsel Act.121  The pardons granted to 
fugitive billionaire Marc Rich and his partner Pincus Greene produced 
instant outrage from all quarters, focused on the key role of former White 
House Counsel Jack Quinn and his manipulation of the Justice Department 
advisory process.122 
But as the press parsed through the many less familiar names in the 
weeks that followed, it became apparent that numerous other grants had 
been secured outside official channels through the intervention of 
individuals with direct access to the President, and that at least some of 
these individuals had been paid handsomely for their efforts.123  Some of 
 
121 The morning after the pardons were issued, the Washington Post noted: “Clinton 
appeared to be tying up loose ends from many of the independent counsel investigations that 
had daunted him and several senior members of his administration virtually from the 
beginning of his tenure.”  Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 17, at A1; see also Stephen 
Braun & Richard Serrano, Clinton Pardons: Ego Fed a Numbers Game, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
25, 2001, at A1.  The President pardoned four individuals convicted as a result of the 
Whitewater Independent Counsel investigation (Susan McDougal, Christopher V. Wade, 
Stephen A. Smith, Robert W. Palmer), his former Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros, and 
Linda Medlar Jones.  Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 17, at A1.  He also “wiped the slate 
clean” on the Independent Counsel’s investigation of former agriculture secretary Mike 
Espy, commuting the sentence of Espy’s former chief of staff Ron Blackley and pardoning 
Richard Douglas, Alvarez T. Ferouillet, John J. Hemmingson, and James Lake  (Archibald 
R. Schaffer III had been pardoned on December 22, 2000, shortly before his sentencing).  Id.  
The President reportedly struggled over whether to pardon his former close political 
associates Webb Hubbell and Jim Guy Tucker, both convicted as a result of the Whitewater 
investigation, but in the end did not.  See OLSON, supra note 118, at 160; Would You Pardon 
Them?, TIME, Feb. 18, 2001, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,99871-2,00.html. 
122 See, e.g., JUSTICE UNDONE, supra note 117, at 99-266. 
123 Commutation grants were made to Harvey Weinig, a New York lawyer convicted of 
money laundering for a major drug organization, who had been privy to a murder-for-hire 
scheme and whose commutation was vigorously opposed by the U.S. Attorney and the 
Justice Department, see Benjamin Weiser, A Felon’s Well-Connected Path to Clemency, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1; four Hasidic Jews convicted of embezzling federal grant 
money intended to benefit their own small community, see Randal C. Archibold, Behind 
Four Pardons, a Sect Eager for Political Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001 at B1; Dorothy 
Rivers and Mel Reynolds, both serving prison terms for fraud and both reportedly 
recommended for release by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, see OLSON, supra note 118, at 156-
58; Deborah A. Devaney, A Voice for Victims: What Prosecutors Can Add to the Clemency 
Process, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 163, 165-66 (2001).  Pardon grants went to a number of well-
connected Arkansas businessmen and lawyers who never filed an application with the Justice 
Department.  See OLSON, supra note 118, at 156-67.  One case that proved embarrassing to 
the President was that of A. Glen Braswell, whose 1983 conviction for mail fraud and 
perjury was pardoned even though he was then the subject of an FBI investigation for tax 
evasion and money laundering.  See Christopher Marquis & Michael Moss, A Clinton In-
Law Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.  It was 
reported in the press that he had paid Hugh Rodham $200,000 to press his case at the White 
House.  See id.  In January 2003, Braswell was arrested and charged with tax evasion.  See 
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the grants involved uses of the pardon power that had not been seen in over 
a century.124 
The verdict of history on President Clinton’s pardoning is likely to be 
that he abused the power, by failing to use it at all for most of his time in 
office, and by using it excessively in the final days to benefit his family and 
friends.  But the experience of Clinton’s final months in office teaches 
another more general lesson: at some point during his term, the process for 
administering the president’s power had come to serve the interests of 
Justice Department prosecutors, rather than those of the presidency.  The 
extraordinary spate of irregular grants on Clinton’s last day in office was as 
much the result of the Justice Department’s neglect of its institutional 
responsibilities as it was of the President’s disregard of his.  By 
discouraging the President from pardoning responsibly earlier in his term, 
by refusing to respond to his interest in pardoning when it belatedly 
manifested itself, and by failing to object more forcefully to the more 
abusive final grants, the Justice Department abandoned both the President 
and its own obligation of stewardship. 
C. GEORGE W. BUSH TAKES A PASS 
At the beginning of his tenure, President George W. Bush vowed to 
follow the advice of the Department of Justice in pardon matters, but he did 
nothing to rejuvenate its pardon program.  Eight years later, bearing out the 
adage about those who do not study the past, well-connected clemency-
 
Calif. Businessman Pardoned by Clinton Arrested for Tax Evasion, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 14, 
2003. 
124 Clinton pardoned his friend J. Fife Symington, III, former Governor of Arizona, who 
was at the time awaiting retrial on charges of mail fraud, and John Deutsch, former Director 
of Central Intelligence, who had pled guilty only the day before of misusing classified 
information.  See Bill Miller & Walter Pincus, Deutsch Had Signed Plea Agreement, Sources 
Say, WASH. POST, JAN. 24, 2001, at A13.  Howard Mechanic, a fugitive from justice for three 
decades faced with a return to prison, was granted a full pardon rather than the commutation 
he had sought.  See Dennis Wagner & Brent Whiting, Mechanic Receives Pardon, Action 
Springs Him from Jail, ARIZ. REPUB., Jan. 21, 2001, at A23.  In what may have been the 
most unusual use of the power, the President preemptively commuted the sentence of his 
college classmate Paul Prosperi, a Florida lawyer who awaiting resentencing after a 
conviction of counterfeiting securities and tax evasion.  The warrant manifesting the Prosperi 
grant stated: “I further hereby commute any total period of confinement that has already 
been imposed or could be imposed . . . that is in excess of 36 months, and I further commute 
any such period of confinement to be served in home confinement.”  Exec. Grant of 
Clemency to Paul Prosperi (Jan. 20, 2001) (on file with Office of the Pardon Attorney); see 
Leon Fooksman, Embezzler Gets House Arrest: Ex-Lawyer Stole $1.8 Million from Irish 
Client, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, March 3, 2001, at B1.  Many of the pardon 
grantees, including those whose convictions been obtained by an independent counsel, did 
not satisfy the five-year eligibility waiting period in Justice Department regulations, and 
some had not even applied for clemency. 
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seekers again bypassed the Justice Department and took their cases directly 
to the White House. This time, as we will see, the anticipated flood of 
irregular grants did not materialize, reportedly because the President 
himself was “disgusted” by irregularity and unfairness in the pardon 
process.125 
Throughout his time in office, President Bush appeared entirely 
indifferent to pardoning, with two very conspicuous exceptions: former 
White House aide Scooter Libby, whose sentence he commuted in June 
2007,126 and two Border Patrol agents convicted of shooting a fleeing drug 
dealer, whose sentences he commuted the day he left office.127  For the 
most part, Bush allowed his pardoning to be dictated by the Justice 
Department, which sustained him on a bland diet of inconsequential post-
sentence pardons, seasoned with an occasional drug commutation.128  Such 
a dull and essentially meaningless pardoning record might have been a 
welcome respite from the drama of Clinton’s scandalous final grants, had it 
not been for the fact that so few were granted while so many were denied: 
Bush issued 200 clemency grants in eight years, and denied more than 
10,000 petitions.129  It is hard to tell what distinguishes the handful of lucky 
 
125 See infra note 133.   
126 See Statement on Granting Executive Clemency to I. Lewis Libby, 43 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 901 (July 2, 2007). 
127 See Dan Eggen & Carrie Johnson, Bush Commutes Sentences of Ex-Agents, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 20, 2009, at A2; Josh Meyer, Bush Commutes Terms of Convicted Border Agents, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at A1. 
128 Bush’s final grant tally was 189 pardons, most of them to individuals with convictions 
more than twenty years old who had served no prison time, and 11 commutations.  Five of 
the commutations went to drug offenders evidently recommended by Justice, three of whom 
were near the end of a long mandatory sentence.  Of the other six commutations, two may 
have been granted over a denial recommendation from Justice (Forte, Harris), and the other 
four were granted without Justice Department recommendations (Libby, Prior, Ramos and 
Compean).  On the Forte grant, see Sara Netter, From Grammys to Prison to Freedom, 
ABCNEWS.COM, Nov. 26, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Music/ 
story?id=6333613&page=1.  On Prior, see Rox Laird, One Lawyer, Then Notable Iowans, 
Then Bush Saw Sentence as Unjust, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 30P; Grant Schulte, 
Pardoned by Bush, Iowan Returns to Freedom, DES MOINES REG. Oct. 16, 2009, at 1.  On 
Ramos and Compean, see supra note 124 (press accounts).  One additional pardon was 
granted to Isaac Toussie without a recommendation from the Justice Department, but it is not 
counted among the official grants because President Bush later declared that it had been 
revoked.  See Charlie Savage, On Clemency Fast Track, via Oval Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
2009, A1. 
129 See Love, Final Report Card on Pardoning by George W. Bush, supra note 2.  In the 
fall of 2006, Bush’s White House Counsel Harriet Miers reportedly urged the Justice 
Department to produce more favorable grants, much as Beth Nolan had done toward the end 
of the Clinton administration.  Her request had no discernible effect on the production of 
favorable recommendations.  Ms. Miers was replaced shortly thereafter by Fred Fielding as 
Counsel to the President, who evidently took no interest in pardons until the final months of 
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winners from the thousands of disappointed suitors, and the record 
establishes that the Justice Department pardon program under George W. 
Bush operated like a lottery. 
Questions about the fairness of the pardon process took on a new 
urgency toward the end of Bush’s tenure, with press reports about case 
backlogs at Justice and high-profile pardon-seekers jumping the line.130  By 
the fall of 2008, apparently frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the Justice 
Department pardon bureaucracy, the White House again began accepting 
clemency petitions directly from people with personal and political 
connections to administration officials, evidently unconcerned about the 
problems this had caused for President Clinton.131  The massive pardoning 
at the end of Bill Clinton’s term had confirmed the popular (though 
historically inaccurate) notion that a lot of end-of-term pardoning was to be 
expected, and the Counsel to the President was visited by a parade of 
aspiring pardon applicants and their lawyers.132  Bush’s White House 
advisers made many of the same mistakes that Clinton’s did, and were 
saved from greater embarrassment only by the President’s own buttoned-up 
conservatism and general parsimony.  Bush later wrote that he had been 
“frustrated” and “disgusted” by the “last-minute frenzy” of pardon requests, 
and that he “came to see the massive injustice” of a system that gave special 
access to people who had “connections to the president.”133  A batch of 
 
Bush’s term.  See, e.g., Richard Schmitt, Clemency Bids Backing Up for Bush; More than 
3,000 Petitions by Federal Inmates Are Pending, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2007, at A15. 
130 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Felons Seeking Bush Pardon Near a Record, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 2008, at A1. 
131 See Savage, supra note 128, at A1 (describing pardons granted to clients represented 
by former lawyers in Bush White House Counsel’s office); Laird, supra note 128, at 30P 
(describing December 17, 2008, meeting at White House between Iowa delegation 
supporting clemency for Prior and White House Counsel Fred Fielding); Schulte, supra note 
128, at 1 (same). 
132 Id. (“A huge backlog at the Justice Department’s pardon review office combined with 
the relatively small number of clemency grants by recent presidents . . . encourages people to 
try to end-run the process—to try to cheat, for lack of a better word, to gain access to the 
White House directly,” quoting pardon scholar P.S. Ruckman). 
133 See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 104 (2010): 
One of the biggest surprises of my presidency was the flood of pardon requests at the end.  I 
could not believe the number of people who pulled me aside to suggest that a friend or former 
colleague deserved a pardon.  At first I was frustrated.  Then I was disgusted.  I came to see the 
massive injustice in the system.  If you had connections to the president, you could insert your 
case into the last-minute frenzy.  Otherwise, you had to wait for the Justice Department to 
conduct a review and make a recommendation.  In my final weeks in office, I resolved that I 
would not pardon anyone who went outside the formal channels. 
President Bush recounted how he had been particularly vexed by Vice President Cheney’s  
intense lobbying in behalf of Scooter Libby, id. at 104-05, and how he had advised his 
successor about how to deal with pardons so as to avoid such personally difficult situations:  
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pardons immediately before Christmas created a stir when the President 
tried to revoke one of them the day after it was announced,134 but his final 
grants were decidedly anticlimactic.  When it became clear at noon on 
January 20, 2009 that the two sentence commutations issued the previous 
day135 was the extent of the final pardoning, dozens of individuals whose 
hopes had been raised by an unusually accessible White House staff were 
bitterly disappointed.  
The paucity of grants at the end of President Bush’s term, like the 
torrent of grants at the end of President Clinton’s, can be attributed to a 
chronically dysfunctional pardon advisory system in the Justice 
Department, a system dominated by prosecutors that produces few 
favorable recommendations, and that serves its own institutional interest 
rather than that of the presidency.  Clinton dealt with that problem by 
staffing pardons in the White House.  Bush did not deal with it at all.  In 
both cases, at the end of the term there were very few favorable 
recommendations from the pardon bureaucracy for the president to act 
upon.  The difference in the final production of pardons for the two 
presidents is attributable to their very different personal inclinations to 
dispense forgiveness, inclinations already in evidence during their 
respective days as governor.   
To his credit, unlike Clinton, Bush appears to have been genuinely 
offended by the undemocratic cronyism of the pardon end-game.  But it was 
his own early decision not to question or give direction to the Justice 
Department in pardon matters that led to what he described as a “massive 
injustice” in the system, just as President Clinton's similar neglect of his 
power had led to similar chaos and unfairness eight years before.  In the 
end, if Bush restrained himself in a way that Clinton did not, he was just as 
 
“On the ride up Pennsylvania Avenue on Inauguration Day, I told Barack Obama about my 
frustrations with the pardon system.  I gave him a suggestion: announce a pardon policy 
early on, and stick to it.” Id. at 105.   
 Nancy Pelosi, a fellow passenger in the presidential limousine, gave her version of the 
conversation in an interview with CNN’s Larry King, reporting that Bush said he was “very 
proud” of not issuing pardons to the politically well-connected.  “He said people who have 
gotten pardons are usually people who have influence or know friends in high places,” a 
route that is “not available to ordinary people,” Pelosi said.  “He thought that there was more 
access for some than others and he was not going to do any.”   Josh Meyer, Bush Rejected 
Pardons for Big-Name Applicants, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2009, at 10. 
134 See David Stout & Eric Lichtblau, Pardon Lasts Just One Day for Developer in 
Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A14 (stating that White House directed Pardon 
Attorney not to execute document conveying pardon to Isaac Robert Toussie, apparently 
because he had made substantial campaign contributions to the Republican Party).  
Questions about whether the Toussie pardon had already become effective and therefore 
could not be revoked were unresolved at the time President Bush left office. 
135 See Savage, Felons Seeking Bush Pardon Near Record, supra note 130, at A1.   
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much at fault for treating pardon as a political third rail throughout his 
presidency, in the end a self-fulfilling prophecy for both men.   
IV. PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL 
An authority on the pardon power suggested twenty years ago that the 
time might have come for pardon “silently to fade away—like collar 
buttons, [its] usefulness at an end.”136  There is no question that pardon has 
faded, but it is not for lack of usefulness.  Recent presidents allowed the 
power to fall into disuse apparently because they saw nothing to be gained 
by pardoning that was not outweighed by the possibility of making a 
politically damaging mistake.  The final section of this paper argues that 
President Obama ought not wait to use his power, if only to avoid 
embarrassment in a final summing up.  It then suggests some ways he can 
minimize the risk pardoning entails. 
A. THE CONTEMPORARY USEFULNESS OF PARDON 
Pardon remains relevant and useful today for three purposes: 
• to do justice in particular cases; 
• to communicate the president’s priorities within the executive 
branch; and 
• to advance the president’s policy agenda with Congress and the 
public. 
History teaches that the demand for clemency increases when the legal 
system lacks other mechanisms for delivering individualized justice, 
recognizing changed circumstances, and correcting errors and inequities.  
Clemency is less necessary, and is therefore less justifiable, when mercy 
“shines in the code.”137  But in the twenty years since the federal sentencing 
guidelines system took effect, the president’s power to commute has been 
invoked frequently because of the severity of mandatory prison terms, 
because federal courts have limited ability to individualize sentences or 
revise a sentence once imposed,138 and because statutory early release 
 
136 MOORE, supra note 16, at 83. 
137 See BECCARIA, supra note 99. 
138 See, e.g., Petition for Commutation of Sentence from Hamedah Hasan, available at 
http://www.dearmrpresidentyesyoucan.org/ (documenting broad support for clemency 
request from woman who has served sixteen years of a twenty-seven-year sentence for her 
role in a drug-trafficking scheme; request denied in 2005); United States v. Harvey, supra 
note 20, 946 F.2d at 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1991) (expressing support for trial judge’s 
recommendation that life sentence for drug trafficking be commuted after fifteen years).  
Hasan’s first clemency petition was denied by President Bush in 2008, as was Harvey’s.  Mr. 
Harvey filed a second clemency petition in March 2010.  See Mimi Hall, Convict Petitions 
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mechanisms have either been repealed or allowed to atrophy.139  Thus, the 
president’s personal intervention in a prisoner’s case through the pardon 
power not only benefits the particular individual, it also reassures the public 
that the legal system is capable of just and moral application.  While 
presidents “ought not invoke the pardon power to convert the Presidency 
into a legislature of one,”140 and while clemency is by its nature somewhat 
arbitrary, at least until laws are reformed and workable statutory relief 
mechanisms adopted, there is a place for clemency.141 
After the court-imposed sentence has been served, pardon plays an 
important role in offender reentry and reintegration.  With the proliferation 
of collateral consequences and easy access to criminal history information, 
the overwhelming majority of people convicted of a crime in America have 
no realistic hope of ever satisfying their debt to society.142  The collateral 
 
Obama to Reduce Crack Penalty, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/washington/2010-04-27-clemency_N.htm. 
139 STEPHEN R. SADY & LYNN DEFFEBACH, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, AND 
THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING AMELIORATIVE STATUTES TO ADDRESS 
UNWARRANTED AND UNAUTHORIZED OVER-INCARCERATION (2008), available at 
http://www.rashkind.com/alternatives/dir_04/Sady_Over-Incarceration.pdf (prepared for the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission Symposium on Alternatives to Incarceration). 
140 Daniel J. Freed & Steven L. Chanenson, Pardon Power and Sentencing Policy, 13 
FED. SENT’G REP. 119, 124 (2001). 
141 See HAY, supra note 11, at 44 (describing pardon as “erratic and capricious, but a 
useful palliative until Parliament reformed the law in the 19th century”).  The American Law 
Institute is considering a recommendation that jurisdictions make provisions for a “second 
look” at lengthy determinate sentences under certain circumstances.  See Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing, Discussion Draft # 3, §§ 305.6, 305.7 (Mar. 29, 2010); Richard F. Frase, Second 
Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194 
(2009). 
142 Particularly since 9/11, laws excluding people with a criminal record from jobs and 
other opportunities have proliferated, and decisionmakers have become more risk-averse.  
Background checks have become the norm for employers, landlords, and other decision-
makers: there are now more than 600 companies engaged in the business of backgrounding, 
and many states have begun to make their court records available for a fee on the internet. 
See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES36-
45 (2007), available at http://www.pardonlaw.com/materials/rev_2ndchance(3).pdf 
(reporting on access to and use of criminal records, and on representation relating to 
collateral consequences); see also Fact Sheet No. 16, Employment Background Checks: A 
Jobseekers Guide, PRIVACY RTS CLEARINGHOUSE, April 2010, http://www.privacyrights.org/ 
fs/fs16-bck.htm.  Surprising as it may seem, in some states a federal offender cannot exercise 
basic civil rights, including the right to vote, without a presidential pardon.  As a result of 
this web of “invisible punishment,” most people convicted of a crime in America are 
deprived of the tools necessary to reestablish themselves as law-abiding and productive 
members of the free community.  The fact that so many of this population are African-
American only aggravates the phenomenon that has been described as “internal exile.”  See 
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consequences of conviction operate as continuing punishment, particularly 
in an era of pervasive background checking, and a just system must afford 
deserving individuals some way of alleviating them.  In the federal system, 
pardon is the only way for a federal offender to overcome the legal 
disabilities and stigma of conviction, since there is no authority for judicial 
expungement or sealing of a criminal record even for a first-time offender.  
For example, pardon provides the only way federal felony offenders can 
regain firearms privileges, avoid deportation, and qualify for an array of 
licenses and benefits under state and federal law.143  Until some alternative 
way is found to give federal offenders a way to satisfy their debt to society, 
there is a place for pardon. 
Within the executive branch, pardon can serve as a useful policy and 
management tool to help the president carry out his constitutional 
obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, in two ways.  
First, the pardon caseload provides a unique birds-eye view of how the 
federal justice system is being administered, revealing where particular laws 
or enforcement policies are overly harsh, and where prosecutorial discretion 
is being unwisely exercised.  In addition, a grant of clemency allows the 
president to intercede directly to change the outcome of a particular case, 
thereby sending a very direct and powerful message about how he wishes 
the law to be enforced by his appointees in the future.  The “extraordinary 
potential for arbitrariness” that some see as an argument against pardon144 
can be turned on its head: a clemency program administered rigorously at a 
national level, in which decision-making is structured and explained, may 
be the best corrective for the sort of systemic arbitrariness that can result 
from unchecked prosecutorial discretion.  In this fashion, pardon can 
address the disparity and overreaching that many believe have 
compromised the integrity of the federal justice system in recent years.  In 
turn, prosecutors can be challenged to regard clemency as something that 
can be useful to them, rather than a threat to their independence or a sign of 
weak resolve.145  Clemency can be a useful management tool for prison 
 
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need For Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 157 (1999); see also Jeremy 
Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: 
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 16 (Meda Chesney-Lind & Marc Mauer eds., 
2002); KELLY SALZMANN & MARGARET LOVE, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN 
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS, (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
cecs/internalexile.pdf. 
143 See Love, supra note 8, at 1722-23; Salzmann & Love, supra note 142, at 45-46. 
144 Freed & Chanenson, supra note 140, at 123. 
145 See Zlotnick, supra note 106 (analyzing five 2000 Clinton commutations where 
rationale for grant served prosecutors’ interests, including correction of a mistake). 
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administrators as well, rewarding good conduct and accomplishment by 
prisoners, and even easing the strain on prison budgets where prisoners are 
elderly or infirm, and can be taken care of more efficiently and effectively 
in the free community.  A grant of executive clemency may be instructive to 
prison officials in interpreting their responsibilities under one or another of 
the early release mechanisms at their disposal. 
As a policy tool, “systematic pardons or exemplary commutations 
[may] prompt debate or motivate a recalcitrant Congress.”146  By pointing 
out flaws in the legal system, pardon can influence attitudes, and build 
consensus for change.  In a very real way, pardon’s highest purpose is to 
accomplish its own demise.147  If a particular grant illustrates some system-
wide problem, as opposed to an exceptional situation not likely to recur, 
pardon’s anecdotal approach can effectively demonstrate the need for 
reform, and encourage public support for it.148  Even in the heyday of 
parole, “changed public opinion after a period of severe penalties” was 
recognized as a respectable basis for the use of the pardon power.149  If a 
judicious use of commutations can draw out support for more flexibility in 
sentencing laws, post-sentence pardons can illustrate the need for 
administrative or judicial relief mechanisms to avoid or mitigate collateral 
legal penalties and the stigma of conviction.150 
Finally, apart from its role in encouraging law reform, pardon can 
educate the public about the justice system and tell good news by 
recognizing and rewarding criminal justice success stories.  When a drug 
 
146 Freed & Chanenson, supra note 140, at 124. 
147 The 1939 Justice Department survey of release procedures in the United States 
pointed out that pardon was the “direct or collateral ancestor of most [statutory release 
procedures].”  3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 59, at 295.  In addition, 
pardon was “the tool by which many of the most important reforms in the substantive 
criminal law have been introduced.”  Id. 
148 The Scooter Libby commutation is a reminder of how powerfully the president can 
speak from this bully pulpit.  The fact that President Bush found Mr. Libby’s thirty-month 
sentence “excessively harsh” (even though it was entirely legal) may influence courts 
looking at other similar cases, embolden defenders arguing for leniency, and encourage the 
United States Sentencing Commission to rethink its guidelines. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, 
Rita, Citing Libby Order, Seeks Rehearing, SCOTUSBLOG, July 16, 2007, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/07/rita-citing-libby-order-seeks-rehearing/. While the 
Libby grant itself is unlikely to persuade Congress or the courts that prison terms for 
nonviolent offenses should be reduced, a more systematic use of the power in less politically 
charged cases might do so. 
149 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 59, at 299. 
150 See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Paterson Rewards Redemption with a Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2010, at A29 (quoting statement of Governor Paterson describing the pardon of 
highly-recommended Chinese immigrant as “the opportunity to make a forceful statement 
about the harsh inequity and rigidity of the immigration laws”).   
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addict turns his life around and becomes a productive member of the 
community or a thief pays restitution to her victims and dedicates her life to 
serving others, a grant of pardon emphasizes the system’s capacity to 
encourage rehabilitation and its redemptive goals.  Not since the nineteenth 
century has pardon been as relevant from both a moral and practical point 
of view, for those who make and apply the law, as well as for those 
convicted of breaking it.  No one should be fooled into thinking otherwise 
by the fact that the power has in recent years been used so sparingly and 
irregularly. 
B. REINVIGORATING THE PARDON PROCESS 
It is clear that the administrative process that facilitated presidential 
pardoning from the Civil War until the 1980s is broken.  Assuming a desire 
by the president to make productive use of the power, the process for 
administering it must be reformed to make it: 
• accessible to ordinary people and guided by clear standards, in 
order to secure and maintain public confidence; 
• well-funded and competently staffed, in order to produce 
thorough and reliable advice; and 
• independent and authoritative, in order to command the respect of 
executive officials and Congress. 
The legitimacy of the president’s use of the pardon power has 
historically depended upon its regular administration and availability to 
ordinary people.  This legitimacy may be called into question when grants 
are made outside of official channels to political allies whose cases are 
indistinguishable from those without the same special access151 or to people 
whose cases have fortuitously attracted media attention.  Similarly, public 
confidence is shaken when those responsible for administering the power 
are seen as blocking access to it, or having an effective veto power over 
presidential actions.152  It is for this reason that some have questioned 
 
151 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Bush Rationale on Libby Stirs Legal Debate, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 4, 2007, at A1 (“In commuting I. Lewis Libby’s 30-month prison sentence on Monday, 
President Bush drew on the same array of arguments about the federal sentencing system 
often made by defense lawyers—and routinely and strenuously opposed by his own Justice 
Department.”); see also George W. Bush, supra note 126 (describing Libby’s thirty-month 
prison term “excessive” for “a first-time offender with years of exceptional public service”). 
152 See Samuel T. Morison, Opinion, A No-Pardon Justice Department, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
6, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/06/opinion/la-oew-morison-pardon-20101106 
(“[T]he bureaucratic managers of the Justice Department's clemency program continue to 
churn out a steady stream of almost uniformly negative advice, in a politically calculated 
attempt to restrain (rather than inform) the president's exercise of discretion.”).  
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whether the pardon power can play a useful part in the justice system as 
long as it is controlled by the Justice Department, which is said to have a 
built-in conflict of interest.153  Some have suggested that the White House 
should administer the power itself.  Others have suggested that the president 
should be advised in pardon matters by an independent board like those in 
many states.154 
It is not clear that such a radical restructuring is necessary.  History 
teaches that the Justice Department can excel at managing the pardon power 
notwithstanding its responsibility for prosecuting cases, and indeed that 
prosecutors need not fear that pardon will denigrate the results of their 
work.  Ensuring a central role for those officially responsible for the 
underlying criminal case gives the president access to information about the 
case, helps insulate the president from political pressure and importuning, 
and maximizes the chances that pardon would advance the administration’s 
law enforcement and criminal justice agenda. 
At the same time, experience since the 1980s has shown that tying the 
pardon advisory function so closely to the interests of prosecutors has made 
it hard to provide the objectivity that the president needs to exercise the 
power wisely and responsibly.  The president needs an advisor who has 
some degree of independence from those who prosecuted the underlying 
criminal case, who can bring to bear a different policy perspective and 
different values, and whose independent political accountability can provide 
the president a measure of protection from public criticism.  For over a 
century that advisor was the attorney general, who combines the roles of 
chief law enforcement officer and political counselor.  Since the late 1990s, 
the Department’s clemency advisory function has served the institutional 
interests of prosecutors rather those of the presidency. 
One possibility going forward is for the president to restore the 
attorney general to a central role in the pardon process and to appoint his 
 
153 See, e.g., Daniel T. Kobil, Reviving Presidential Clemency in Cases of “Unfortunate 
Guilt,” 21 FED SENT’G REP. 160, 163 (2009) (“Given the prosecutorial responsibilities of the 
Justice Department, there is a conflict of interest present when its attorneys must also serve 
as the gatekeepers for clemency.”); Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control Pardons in the 
Henhouse?, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 177, 178 (2001) (“The pardon process seems to have been 
captured by the very prosecutors who run our inevitably flawed criminal justice system.”). 
154 See Barkow, supra note 5, at 157 (stating that administrative clemency boards can 
“take the heat for decisions that turn out badly”); Kobil, supra note 153, at 163 (“[T]he 
president should look for advice to either a body of professionals charged with the sole task 
of reviewing clemency requests, or to a group of volunteers appointed because of their 
expertise . . . .”).  A recent example is Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm’s use of a 
citizens’ advisory board in commuting prison sentences.  See Liedel, supra note 5, at A28  
(“Prisoner commutations have been rare and safe for public”).  State clemency boards are 
described in RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 18-38.  
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own pardon attorney.155  Another possibility is to install a permanent 
clemency advisory board similar to those used on an ad hoc basis by 
Presidents Coolidge, Truman, and Ford.156  In any case, the president and 
attorney general need to encourage the U.S. Attorneys to regard pardon as 
helpful rather than threatening to their work, and invite them to support 
worthy pardon cases. 
The president ought also to make public his clemency policy and the 
standards for favorable consideration of clemency applications, and return 
to a practice of prompt and generous pardoning: “[i]nactivity can be just as 
politically risky as granting a questionable pardon,” since “observers 
become more suspicious and skeptical of those lucky few who are 
pardoned.”157  Critics of pardoning have pointed to its reliance on 
“unstructured, unexplained discretion,”158 but this is not inevitable.  The 
president could establish a policy of disclosure after a clemency case has 
been finally acted upon, to introduce a degree of accountability into the 
pardon process, and consider returning to the pre-1931 practice of giving 
reasons for each grant, as many governors do.159  In order to divert some of 
the commutation caseload, he could direct the attorney general to make 
maximum use of statutory alternatives to clemency.160  Staffing may be a 
 
155 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Guarding the Integrity of the Clemency Power, 13 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 180, 181-82 (2001) (stating that responsibility for staffing clemency cases 
should remain in the Justice Department, but program should be restructured so as to restore 
attorney general’s role in process). The president might also choose to emulate President 
Cleveland in his second term, and work directly with the pardon attorney.  See supra pp. 
113-14.  
156 See 1924 ATT’Y GEN. REP. 387 (1924), discussed in HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 94 
(board appointed to consider cases prosecuted under wartime emergency authorities that 
pardon attorney staff “did not have time to investigate properly”); Exec. Order 9814, 11 Fed. 
Reg. 14,645 (1946) (order creating board to consider pardons for Selective Service Act 
violators after World War II); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BD., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
(1975) (administration of President Ford’s Vietnam amnesty proclamation); see also Daniel 
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 
TEX. L. REV. 569, 622 (1991) (recommending bifurcated system, involving appointed board 
to consider and make recommendations in “ordinary” pardon cases, leaving the president 
unconstrained to consider more “political” uses of the power). 
157 CROUCH, supra note 14, at 24.  Prior to the Reagan Administration, presidents acted 
favorably on at least 30% of the petitions filed.  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
158 Freed & Chanenson, supra note 140, at 124. 
159 See, e.g., VIRGINIA GOVERNOR’S ANNUAL REPORTS TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1974-
Present) available at http://leg2.state.va.us/DLS/h&sdocs.nsf/Search+All+Published/ 
?SearchView&SearchOrder=4&query=clemency (“List of Pardons, Commutations, 
Reprieves, and Other Forms of Executive Clemency,” including reasons for granting pardon 
in each case). 
160 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i) (2006) (granting court authority to reduce 
sentence on motion of the Bureau of Prisons if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” 
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concern if a reinvigorated pardon power turns out to be wildly popular, 
though it is instructive to recall that for many years hundreds of clemency 
cases were capably handled each year by a very small staff.161 
Finally, the president should take advantage of clemency’s strategic 
potential, by recognizing particularly harsh mandatory sentences, mitigating 
unwarranted disparity among codefendants, giving retroactive effect to 
changes in the law, sending home prisoners who are seriously ill or elderly, 
and restoring rights to individuals who have a need for relief from some 
specific collateral penalty, such as deportation.  A senior attorney in the 
White House Counsel’s office should be assigned to review the Justice 
Department’s clemency recommendations and advise the president on 
pardon matters with larger policy goals in mind, and the president should 
schedule regular opportunities to review and act on clemency requests.  The 
White House should publicize clemency grants and the reasons for each 
one, putting a human face on the individuals benefiting from the president’s 
mercy.  None of this can happen if there is not a prior decision to take 
pardoning and the pardon process seriously.  At this writing, things do not 
look hopeful.162 
V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout our nation’s history, the president’s pardon power has 
been used generously and regularly, to correct systemic injustices and to 
 
warrant such a reduction); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4) (2006) (granting authority to deport certain 
non-citizen prisoners). 
161 See supra note 49.  It has been customary since the early 1990s for the pardon 
attorney to prepare very cursory reports in cases deemed meritless and otherwise unworthy 
of the president’s attention.  During the Obama presidency, the author understands that the 
pardon attorney has stopped sending forward reports in most commutations, providing little 
more than the name and offense of clemency applicants proposed for denial. It is obviously 
difficult for the president to reach an independent assessment of the merits of a clemency 
case without at least some report. 
162 According to news reports, discussions about restructuring the pardon process took 
place in the Justice Department and White House during the early months of the Obama 
Administration, but proposal for thoroughgoing reforms were shelved after the two high-
ranking officials interested in the subject left the administration.  See Joe Palazzolo, Despite 
Efforts, Pardon System Still Unchanged, MAIN JUSTICE, Apr. 20, 2010, 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/20/despite-efforts-pardons-system-still-unchanged/.  
Meanwhile, calls for reform of the pardon process have come even from the Supreme Court.  
See Josh Gerstein, Justice Kennedy Prods Obama to Commute Sentences, POLITICO, Mar. 30, 
2010, http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0310/Justice_Kennedy_prods_Obama_to 
_commute_sentences.html; see also Kenneth Lee, Obama Should Exercise the Pardon 
Power, NAT’L L.J., April 12, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp? 
id=1202447826608&Obama_should_exercise_the_pardon_power&hbxlogin=1; Margaret 
Colgate Love, Looking for the Pardon Power? Try the Supreme Court, ACSBLOG, Apr. 14, 
2010, http://www.acslaw.org/node/15863. 
1212 MARGARET COLGATE LOVE [Vol. 100 
advance the executive’s policy goals.  Since 1980, however, presidential 
pardoning has fallen on hard times, its benign purposes frustrated by 
politicians’ fear of making a mistake and subverted by unfairness in the 
way pardons are granted.  Much responsibility for the disuse and disrepute 
into which a once-proud and useful institution of government has fallen 
must be laid at the door of the Justice Department, which during the past 
two administrations failed in its responsibilities as steward of the power, 
exposing the president to embarrassment and the power to abuse.  Another 
president should not be compelled to accept such poor service.  That said, 
considering the criticism leveled against Bill Clinton’s excesses and George 
Bush’s parsimony, it is little wonder that Barack Obama has yet to take this 
constitutional power seriously.  Yet pardon has important uses in the federal 
justice system, and recent experience has shown that a president who fails 
to pardon regularly throughout his term will have difficulty dealing with 
pent-up demand at its conclusion.  And so President Obama would be well-
advised to get curious soon about a constitutional power that is uniquely 
his, which promises so much but of late has delivered so little. 
